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Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the 
Cohen Maledicta That Bar First Amendment 
Protection for Newsgathering 
ERIC B. EASTON* 
A jury's verdict of $5.5 million in punitive damages against ABC News in 
a lawsuit brought by Food Lion, Inc. denwnstrated the danger of a legal 
regime that provides no First Amendment protection for journalists who commit 
state-law torts during newsgathering. Insidious dicta in Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co., a 1991 Supreme Court opinion, has hardened into doctrines that 
preclude First Amendment protection for newsgathering torts. In Cohen, 
Justice White said that the First Amendment offers no protection from the 
enforcement of "generally applicable laws" against newsgatherers and that 
First Amendment protection applies only to information that has been "lawfully 
acquired. " 
This Article shows that these doctrines are not only false, but have already 
done serious damage to First Amendment interests. It surveys lower court 
decisions from around the country to denwnstrate the doctrines' pernicious 
influence, then it evaluates alternative solutions to the problem. The Article 
concludes that the nwst effective, if /eO$( likely, solution would be a rnle that 
tracks the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan "actual malice" standard, 
redefined as "bad faith" or "outrageous behavior" when applied to 
newsgathering torts. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 22, 1997, a federal jury in North Carolina awarded Food Lion, 
Inc. $5.5 million in punitive damages to punish Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. for the 
way it acquired a story for the magazine program PrimeTime Live that exposed 
unsanitary practices in Food Lion grocery stores. I Earlier, the same jury had 
found ABC liable for fraud, trespass, and breach of loyalty during the 
*Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.S., Northwestern 
University, 1%8; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 1989. The author would like 
to acknowledge the advice and support of his colleagues, especially :Professor Michael I. 
Meyerson, Professor David Bogen of the University of Maryland School of Law, and 
research assistant Anthony Dale. 
1 See Howard Kurtz & Sue Anne Pressley, Jury FilU!s Against ABC for $5.5 Million, 
WASH. Posr, Jan. 23, 1997, atAl. 
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newsgathering process and awarded Food Lion $1402 in compensatory 
damages.2 
The award may have been merely a "slap on the wrist," as one juror later 
characterized it,3 but for most news organizations $5.5 million is real money. 
And notwithstanding the self-righteous disclaimers that followed, especially 
from newspapers,4 ABC's actions in the case were not so very different from 
the actions of investigative reporters dating back to 1886, when Nellie Bly 
feigned insanity to do an expose on inhumane conditions in an insane asylum 
for Joseph Pulitzer's New York World.s 
Following a tip, two ABC producers lied about their identities to Food Lion 
management and were hired as grocery store clerks.6 Using hidden cameras 
and microphones, they obtained video evidence showing that the store sold 
tainted meat and later broadcast parts of that video tape on November 5, 1992.7 
Plaintiff Food Lion was unwilling or unable to vindicate its reputation 
through a libel or false light privacy suit, so it was never required to challenge 
the accuracy of the broadcast in court. 8 Although the trial judge denied the 
2 See id. at A6; FoodlionAwardedDamages From ABC, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1996, 
at D4; Howard Kurtz, Jury Finds ABC Committed Fraud in Food Lion Investigative Story, 
WASH. Posr, Dec. 21, 1996, at A7. The jury awarded Food Lion $1400 in damages for 
fraud (representing some, but not all, of the wages paid) and $1 each for trespassing and 
breach ofloyalty. See Scott Andron, Food Lion versus ABC, QUill, Mar. 1997, at 20. 
3 Jury Awards' Food lion $5.5 Million in ABC Case, NEWs MEDIA & L., Wmter 1997, 
at4. 
4 See, e.g., Food Lion Decision Leaves a Bad Taste in the Mouth, NEWs MEDIA & L., 
Winter 1997, at 2 ("This self-righteousness was displayed primarily, though not exclusively, 
by print journalists."); Dorothy Rabinowitz, ABC's Food Lion Mission, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
11, 1997, at A20 ("Many journalists continue to believe that they are involved in a calling so 
high as to entitle them to rights not given ordinary citizens."). 
5 See MICHAEL EMERY & EDWIN EMERY, THE PREss AND AMERICA 210 (6th ed. 
1988); MELVIN MENCHER, NEWS REPORTING AND WRITING 615 (5th ed. 1991); MrrcHErL 
STEPHENS, A HlsroRY OF NEWS 249 (1988). 
6 See Howard Kurtz, Jury Finds ABC Committed Fraud in Food Lion Investigative 
Story, WASH. Posr, Dec. 21, 1996, atA7. 
7 Seeid. 
8 While Food Lion vigorously denied the allegations in the story, it initially believed it 
could not carry the heavy burden of proving libel. Later, after ABC turned over additional 
out-takes, the company asked the federal district court to extend North Carolina's one-year 
limitations period on libel, which had already run. Judge P. Trevor Sharp rejected the 
company's request, finding the claim of new evidence "unpersuasive and exaggerated." 
Andron, supra note 2, at 15, 19. 
The veracity of ABC's story is expected to be litigated in a shareholder suit against Food 
Lion, alleging that management pmposely misled shareholders about sanitary and labor 
practices in an effort to inflate stock prices. See Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., No. 92-696 
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company's request for $2.5 billion in damages tied to its loss of business and 
stock value,9 he permitted the jury to award $1402 in compensatory damages 
for fraud, trespass, and breach of loyalty .10 Most importantly, he permitted the 
jury to consider and award punitive damages.ll 
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. is only the latest in a long 
series of lawsuits that aimed to circumvent the First Amendment protections 
that have been accorded to libel, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress-all publication-dependent torts-and similar causes of action 
against the press by focusing not on the publication or broadcast, but on the 
newsgathering process itself.12 Why newsgathering torts have become the focus 
of plaintiffs that believe they have been unfairly treated by the media presents 
no great mystery. While libel and related lawsuits are alive and well at the trial 
level, 13 more than half of all plaintiffs' judgments are reversed, remanded, or 
reduced on appeal, 14 where appellate judges are charged with independently 
applying the exacting standards compelled by the First Amendment.15 Although 
(M.D.N.C. filed 1992), discussed in David E. Rovella, Food Lion Swats ABC, but Investors 
WantAnswers, NAT'LL.J., Feb. 10, 1997, atA7. 
9 See Kurtz, supra note 6, at A 7. 
10 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13214, at 
*3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 1997). 
11 On August 29, 1997, the court held that the punitive damage award was excessive and 
ordered a remittitur of all punitive damages above $315,000. See id. at *48-50. 
12 One observer lists among these s<H:alled "trash torts:" "interference with contracts, 
stalking, trespass, intrusion upon seclusion, invasion of privacy, interference with law 
enforcement, negligence, conspiracy, and infliction of emotional distress." Paul McMasters, 
It Didn't Have to Come to This, QUILL, Mar. 1997, at 18. For an earlier and more scholarly 
view of the phenomenon, see Todd F. Simon & Mary M. Cronin, Searching for Media 
Liability: The Law's Response to Perceived Changes in Banns Caused l7y Mass Media 
(presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass 
Communication, Aug. 11, 1990) [hereinafter Media Liability]. 
13 Just one week before the first Food Lion verdict, a federal july in Miami, Florida, 
ordered ABC to pay $10 million in libel damages to financier Alan Levan for a 1991 story 
that appeared on the news magazine 20120. See Kyle Pope, ABC Network Loses Libel Suit 
Over '20/20', WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1996, at Bl. Pope quotes a preliminary report from the 
Libel Defense Resource Center shO\ving the mean libel july verdict in 1996, prior to the ABC 
judgment, was $2.4 million, more than double the median of $985,000 of the previous two-
year period and more than ten times the $175,000 two-year median of 1992-1993. See id. 
14 See Reversal of Libel Verdicts Is Comnwn, LDRC Study Finds, [News Notes] 24 
MediaL. Rep. (BNA) No. 39 (Oct. 8, 1996). 
15 See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-86 
(1989) (holding that whether evidence is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a 
question of law and that revie\ving courts must fully consider the factual record); Bose Corp. 
v. Consumers Union of the United States, 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (holding that federal 
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no such records are kept of newsgathering verdicts, plaintiffs have a good 
reason to believe that the odds of reversal are much longer: the Supreme Court 
has never clearly articulated the scope of First Amendment protection for 
newsgathering. There are no constitutional standards against which appellate 
courts must measure a tort plaintiff's showing. 
Moreover, those would-be plaintiffs that may be unwilling to leave 
questions of falsity or fault in the hands of a jury are probably justified in 
assuming that they may bring a newsgathering-based action without meeting the 
rigorous standards imposed on libel plaintiffs.16 For that, plaintiffs have to 
thank two doctrines derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co.11 that serve to deprive the news media of important First 
Amendment protections for both newsgathering and dissemination: the First 
Amendment offers no special immunity from "generally applicable laws"18 and 
First Amendment protection applies only to information that has been "lawfully 
acquired. "19 
This Article will examine these doctrines with a view toward exposing their 
role in obstructing the natural evolution of a constitutional rule that ensures First 
Amendment values are taken into account when tort liability for reporters' 
conduct in gathering news is alleged. Part II will discuss what little the Supreme 
Court has already told us about First Amendment protection for newsgathering 
and place that in the context of other press clause jurisprudence, including New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan20 and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwel[.21 Part ill 
will examine the Cohen case in detail, dissecting and debunking the two major 
doctrines that now effectively deprive newsgathering of constitutional 
protection. Part IV will review the damage those flawed doctrines have already 
done in trial and appellate courts around the country. And Part V will discuss 
courts of appeal must exercise their own judgment in determining whether actual malice was 
shown with convincing clarity). 
16 Prospective plaintiffs learned that publication-related torts would have to meet libel 
standards when the Reverend Jerry Falwell sued Hustler magazine for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress based on a tasteless and suggestive parody in which the televangelist was 
featured. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) ("We conclude that 
public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in 
addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual 
malice,' i.e., with lmowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to 
whether or not it was true."). 
17 501 u.s. 663 (1991). 
18 ld. at 669. 
19 Id. 
20 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
21 485 u.s. 46 (1988). 
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alternative approaches toward a new constitutional rule that might evolve, 
indeed that might have already evolved, in the absence of the Cohen 
"maledicta." 
This Article concludes that, although the First Amendment confers no 
immunity upon the press to violate laws of general applicability or to commit 
tortious or unlawful acts in pursuit of the news, neither do such violations 
relieve the courts of responsibility to consider the First Amendment values at 
stake, weigh them against the other societal values represented by the laws in 
question, and, where appropriate, adjust those laws to accommodate any higher 
values they may find. Where this is done, case by case, unobstructed by 
misguided Supreme Court dicta, a theory of First Amendment protection for 
news gathering will evolve naturally. Ultimately, this Article suggests that the 
most efficacious, although perhaps least likely, result of such unencumbered 
evolution is a rule that tracks the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan "actual 
malice" standard, redefined as "bad faith" or "outrageous behavior" when 
applied to newsgathering torts. Neither this standard nor any other, however, 
will emerge from the constitutional common law process until the Cohen 
doctrines are disavowed or disregarded. 
II. FIRsT AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR NEWSGATHERING 
We can be reasonably sure that newsgathering,22 as we know it today, was 
not foremost in the minds of those who drafted the Bill of Rights when they 
conceived the press clause of the First Amendment. Indeed, the active pursuit 
of information through correspondents was minimal in eighteenth-century 
America with most newspapers content to rely on each other, foreign 
newspapers, and letters for newsworthy items.23 News was being covered in 
the early nineteenth-century, but only "in fits and starts, often hazily, often 
laggardly, usually in third- or fourth-hand reports, often obscured by the 
prejudices of partisans. And with few exceptions, news was not being 
uncovered. American newspapers had yet to discover the power of 
reporting. "24 
22 In this Article, the term "newsgathering" is used to describe a broad range of 
activities undertaken by journalists in order to collect the information they intend to 
disseminate (i.e., publish or broadcast). In the case of "live" broadcasts, newsgathering and 
dissemination occur simultaneously, although the processes must be separated for purposes of 
legal analysis. A more precise definition might be "the pursuit of independently verifiable 
facts about current events through entexprise, observation and investigation." STEPHENS, 
supra note 5, at 229. 
23 See id. at 230. 
24 !d. at 225. 
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Not unreasonably, the degree of constitutional protection accorded to 
newsgathering is held to be distinct from and lower than that given 
dissemination, even though today we conceive of the former as a prerequisite to 
the latter. Whatever constitutional protection there may be for news gathering 
derives not from its own place in eighteenth-century democratic ideal:;., but 
from modern notions of its indispensability to the constitutional functions of the 
press in society. 
Among those functions are some that may seem remote from the mundane 
newsgathering process, such as providing a means for individual self-fulfillment 
through the expression of ideas and opinions, or allowing the venting of those 
ideas and opinions to serve as a safety valve for society as a whole, or finding 
some eternal political truth in the clash of those ideas and opinions25 on a 
Miltonian battlefield26 or in a Holmesian marketplace.27 Other functions, 
however, simply cannot be fulfilled without the freedom to gather as well as 
disseminate news. 
One cannot, for example, embrace Alexander Meiklejohn's idea of 
freedom of the press as ensuring that the public will have the information 
necessary to make informed judgments in a self-governing society without 
presupposing that the press would be free to gather that information. 28 Much of 
the credit for the reform agenda of the Progressive era goes to the investigative 
reporters of the first decade of the twentieth-century: Lincoln Steffens, Ida 
Tarbell, Ray Stannard Baker, Upton Sinclair, and others.29 "To these writers 
and to the fast-growing muckraking magazines goes the credit for arousing a 
lethargic public to righteous indignation. They spotlighted Progressivism, and 
gave this political movement the impetus that aided it in the passage of social 
and economic legislation. "30 
Without First Amendment protections, the press also could not perform 
what Vincent Blasi and Lucas Powe see as its "watchdog" or "checking" 
function, exposing governmental misconduct and holding it accountable to the 
public. 31 Although the major Watergate revelations came too late to prevent 
25 See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amerulment, 72 YALE 
L.J. 877 (1963), reprinted in part in FIRsT AMENDMENT ANTHOLOGY 8-12 (Donald E. 
Lively et al. eds., 1994) (summarizing these ideas). 
26 See JoHN MILTON, .AREOPAGIDCA 167 (New York, Grolier 1890) (1644). 
27 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
28 See Alexander Meiklejolm, The First Amerulment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
245, reprinted in FIRsT AMENDMENT ANTHOLOGY 2-3 (Donald E. Lively et al. eds., 1994). 
29 See ARTIIUR WEINBERG & Ln.A WEINBERG, THE MUCKRAKERS 1902-1912 at xvi-
xviii (1961). 
30 Id. at xviii. 
31 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amerulment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
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President Nixon's re-election, the work of the Washington Post's Bob 
Woodward and Carl Bernstein, and later the New York Times's Seymour Hersh 
and the Los Angeles Times's Jack Nelson, eventually contributed to his 
resignation and the end of what President Ford called "our long national 
nightmare. "32 
Notwithstanding its importance to First Amendment values, however, 
newsgathering is still merely conduct, not speech. And although the Supreme 
Court has articulated a reasonably well-defined set of principles for dealing with 
other protected conduct, namely symbolic speech or expressive conduct, 33 the 
conduct we call newsgathering has only occasionally been considered by the 
Supreme Court, and the rules are not at all clear. 
We know that the Constitution affords some degree of protection for 
newsgathering, 34 but we do not fully understand the scope of that protection or 
how to gauge when our freedom to gather news has been unconstitutionally 
abridged. We know, for example, that First Amendment protection extends to 
"routine newspaper reporting techniques, "35 but we do not know exactly where 
"routine" ends and extraordinary begins36 or what degree of protection must be 
FOUND. REs. J. 521, 527; see also LUCAS POWE, THE FOURTII EsrATE AND TilE 
CoNSTITIJTION 298 (1991) (arguing that "freedom of the press is an integral part of the 
checks" provided for in the Constirution). 
32 EMERY & EMERY, supra note 5, at 507-15. 
33 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that 
expressive conduct may be regulated if such regulation is "\vithin the constirutional power of 
the government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest"). 
34 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("Nor is it suggested that news 
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for 
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."). 
35 Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979) ("These cases involved 
situations where the government itself provided or made possible press access to the 
information. That factor is not controlling. Here respondents relied upon routine newspaper 
reporting techniques to ascertain the identity of the alleged assailant. A free press cannot be 
made to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to supply it with information."). 
36 We do know that "[t]he use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or 
restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means within the law." 
Bran:zburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82. The Bran:zburg Court also tells us that "grand jury 
investigations ... instiruted or conducted other than in good faith ... to disrupt a reporter's 
relationship with his news sources would have no justification" under the First Amendment. 
/d. at 707-08. 
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accorded routine television reporting.37 
We are also told that newsgatherers have no right of access to people, 
places, and documents beyond that granted to the general public,38 although the 
Court has recognized that journalists are frequently given preferential treatment 
as public surrogates. 39 Finally, we are told that the First Amendment does not 
immunize journalists from torts or crimes committed while gathering news, 40 
although lower courts sometimes strain to avoid finding liability.41 Before 
Cohen, the Supreme Court had never reviewed the tort-like behavior of the 
news media independent of publication. 42 
Beyond these few general principles, most people are uncertain about 
which news gathering activities are, or are not, protected. 43 While that may be 
problematic for journalists and media lawyers, the absence of some overarching 
theory of First Amendment protection for newsgathering is not terribly 
surprising. First Amendment jurisprudence has largely defied attempts to 
construct any unified theory# and, for better or worse, our constitutional 
doctrines have largely evolved gradually, one case at a time. That is precisely 
the process that was incorrectly and unnecessarily short-circuited by the 
37 Even the most routine broadcast reporting techniques are often prohibited in places 
where print journalists may work freely. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 
(1965) (finding no First Amendment right to televise trials). 
38 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 
417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974). 
39 See •. e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980) 
("As a practical matter, however, the institutional press is the likely, and fitting, chief 
beneficiary of a right of access because it serves as the 'agent' of interested citizens, and 
funnels information about trials to a large number of individuals."). 
40 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682 ("It is clear that the First Amendment does not 
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of 
civil or criminal statutes of general applicability."). 
41 See infra notes 430-31 and accompanying text. 
42 Arguably, the Court erred in considering Cohen without reference to publication as 
well. See irifra text accompanying note 300. 
43 See John W. Wade, The Tort liability of Investigative Reporters, 31 V AND. L. REv. 
301 (1984) (attempting to define the parameters of protected newsgathering activities). 
44 Because of this, Rodney Smolla explains that "[t]he modem student of free speech 
will quickly be tempted to abandon the search for general organizing principles, instead 
treating each pocket of conflict as a discrete 'law unto itself.'" RoDNEY A. SMoUA, FREE 
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 18 (1992). Martin Redish writes, "There seems to be general 
agreement that the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to devise a coherent theory of free 
expression. These efforts have been characterized by 'a pattern of aborted doctrines, shifting 
rationales, and frequent changes of position by individual Justices.'" MARTIN H. REDISH, 
FREEDoM OF EXPRESSION: A CRrriCAL ANALYSIS 9 (1984), reprinted in Fmsr AMENDMENT 
ANrnOLOGY 17 (Donald E. Uvely et al. eds., 1994). 
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doctrines enunciated in Cohen and their adoption by lower court judges. The 
pendency of important newsgathering tort cases, including Food Lion, demands 
returning to first principles, debunking the false doctrines in Cohen, and 
allowing the normal evolutionary process to continue. That process begins with 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan-the first time that a civil lawsuit against the 
news media under state tort law was held to implicate the First Amendment 45 
That landmark decision, which imposed a heavy constitutional burden on public 
officials who invoke state libel law against criticism of their official conduct, 46 
was subsequently extended to impose the same burden in cases involving 
criminal libel, 47 false light privacy, 48 public figure plaintiffs, 49 and matters of 
public interest regardless of the status of the plaintiff. 50 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan concerned alleged injury associated with 
publication, not newsgathering, and courts have been quite comfortable 
drawing a line between the two and rendering New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
inapposite in discussing, for example, intrusion on seclusion or trespass. 51 But 
the line between newsgathering and dissemination is not nearly so clear. 
Indeed, the constitutional burden imposed upon libel plaintiffs-that they 
demonstrate actual malice (i.e., knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the 
truth)-may require an inquiry into the newsgathering process. 52 While the 
45 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
46 See id. at 279-80, 285-86. Notably, the Court required that a public official plaintiff 
must prove actual malice, that is, knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, with 
convincing clarity. See id. 
47 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964). 
48 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967). 
49 See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
50 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30-32 (1971). This plurality 
opinion was subsequently rejected in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 
(1974) (holding that states may define the appropriate standard of liability for libel of a private 
individual, so long as they do not impose liability 'vithout fault). 
51 See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (denying that the 
First Amendment privileges reporters to enter a plaintiff's home by misrepresenting their 
identity and purpose in order to surreptitiously photograph and record his unlawful activities); 
Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (rejecting the proposition that the 
First Amendment privileges a photographer from engaging in trespass, intrusion, and other 
torts to photograph Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and her family); Le Mistral, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (finding that the First 
Amendment does not insulate the news media from trespass claims). Needless to say, all three 
of these warhorses might suffer under a fully developed First Amendment right to gather 
news. 
52 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 158 (1979) (permitting libel plaintiffs to 
discover evidence of discussions between reporters and editors in the newsroom during the 
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Court has eschewed setting express standards for newsgathering by which to 
measure a libel defendant's culpability,53 a journalist who entertains serious 
doubts about the accuracy of a story is bound to investigate further and remove 
those doubts before publishing. 54 
Thus, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny arguably create 
constitutional limitations on the duty of care in newsgathering-at least as to 
accuracy-owed to certain plaintiffs. Merely negligent newsgathering regarding 
public plaintiffs that results in a false and defamatory story is not actionable. 
Admittedly, such harmful conduct would not normally be challenged without 
publication; but one cannot say that the conduct itself lacks constitutional 
significance. Indeed, one might be justified in finding that New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan stands for the proposition that all laws governing a journalist's 
professional activities must be applied with due consideration to First 
Amendment values. 55 
The consensus in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was always a fragile 
newsgathering and production process). 
53 Justice Harlan's plurality opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 
155 (1967), suggested that a public figure libel plaintiff should prevail on a showing of 
"highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of 
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." That opinion was 
"emphatically rejected by a majority of the Court in favor of the stricter New York Times [Co. 
v. Sullivan] actual malice standard." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 
491 u.s. 657, 666 (1989). 
54 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
55 As Justice Brennan wrote with respect to libel, 
[W]e are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the 
epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. Like insurrection, 
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal 
business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been 
challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional 
limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfY the First Amendment. 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1963) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
A reporter's negligent driving and similar hypothetical conduct are sometimes cited to 
cast doubt on this proposition. See, e.g., Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp. 392, 404 
(W.D. Tex. 1996) ("As Plaintiffs note, it would be ludicrous to assume that the First 
Amendment would protect a reporter who negligently ran over a pedestrian while speeding 
merely because the reporter was on the way to cover a news story."). Obviously, there must 
be some degree of attenuation from the newsgathering function at which the conduct has no 
constitutional significance. Usually, common sense is sufficient to make the distinction, unless 
the pmpose is to confuse the issue by raising a red herring. 
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one, 56 and it began to unravel in succeeding cases. By the time Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc. was decided in 1971, a plurality barely existed to further 
extend its most rigorous standards to include private figure plaintiffs. 57 Yet not 
even Justice White, who would soon become the Court's most outspoken 
opponent of expanding the press's constitutional protection, was ready to retreat 
from the notion that, in protecting the press, the First Amendment might 
impose some burden on private citizens. 58 Concurring in the judgment, he 
asserted that the First Amendment gives the media a privilege to "report and 
comment upon the official actions of public servants in full detail, with no 
requirement that the reputation or the privacy of an individual involved in or 
affected by the official action be spared from public view. "59 
With Rosenbloom, the prevailing image of the press had begun to change. 
Justice White, for one, began to view the press as a potential persecutor, rather 
than protector, of the public interest: 
Some members of the Court seem haunted by fears of self-censorship by the 
press and of damage judgments that will threaten its financial health. But 
technology has immeasurably increased the power of the press to do both good 
and evil. Vast communication combines have been built into profitable 
56 The making of that majority is discussed in ANrHONY LEwis, MAKE No LAw 170-
82 (1991). 
57 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 32 (1971). 
58 See id. at 61-62 (White, J., concurring). 
59 /d. at 62. Justice White's bold dicnun in Rosenbloom has never been followed, of 
course, and, as will be shown, was fundamentally incompatible with his subsequent decisions. 
Indeed, when CBS, Inc. was recently sued for invasion of privacy by a family who was 
videotaped in their home by a CBS News crew accompanying federal agents executing a valid 
search warrant, the broadcaster did not even raise a First Amendment defense. See Ayeni v. 
CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). The district court, finding CBS's 
purpose in taping the scene was to "titillate and entertain others" for profit, held that neither 
the federal agents nor CBS was entitled to dismissal on the ground of qualified immunity. See 
id. CBS settled on confidential terms and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed as to the federal agents. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 684 n.2, 686 (2d Cir. 
1994). The court held that it was objectively unreasonable for the federal agents to believe 
that inviting CBS to the scene was lawful. See id. at 686. In a similar case, one Eighth Circuit 
judge questioned the Ayeni holding, calling it "at most only the beginnings of a trend in the 
law." Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445, 447 (8th Cir. 1996) (Arnold, J., dicnun). However, 
another judge expressly agreed with Ayeni. See id. at 448 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). The 
district court below also agreed \vith Ayeni. See Parker v. Clarke, 905 F. Supp. 638, 643 
(E.D. Mo. 1995). None of these jurists even considered the kind of First Amendment 
privilege Justice White's Rosenbloom dicnun suggests. 
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ventures. 60 
Justice White's growing suspicion of the press was no doubt reaffirmed by 
New York Times Co. v. United States61-the Pentagon Papers controversy that 
reached the Court later the same month. While not technically a newsgathering 
case, New York Times Co. v. United States gave Justice White an opportunity to 
express the view that the New York Times and the Washington Post stood 
exposed to the full weight of the criminal law if the goveinment chose to 
prosecute under Espionage Act provisions barring the unauthorized possession 
of national defense information. 62 The government did indict Daniel Ellsberg, 
who leaked the materials to the Times and the Post, as well as a colleague, 
An!hony Russo. Those prosecutions were dropped in the wake of revelations 
regarding the White House plumbers, and no charges were brought against the 
newspapers. 63 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court retreated from its position in 
Rosenbloom in favor of lighter, but nonetheless substantial, constitutional 
burdens on private figure plaintiffs.64 But Justice White's position had 
60 Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 60 (White, J., concurring). 
61 403 u.s. 713 (1971). 
62 See id. at 740 (White, J., concurring). Although White's concurring opinion did not 
explicitly discuss newsgathering, as distinguished from publication, he pointed out that 
newspapers were vulnerable to prosecution under the Espionage Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) 
(1994), regardless of whether they had published the material. See id. at 738 n.9. David 
Rudenstine notes that White had inquired of the Solicitor General, Erwin Griswold, about 
criminal prosecution during oral argument. 
When Griswold answered that he could not imagine the govenunent criminally 
prosecuting the newspapers for publishing material the Supreme Court refused to enjoin, 
White was sufficiently agitated that he complained during the [J]ustice's conference that 
the [S]olicitor [G]eneral had given away the threat of criminal prosecution during his 
oral argument. 
DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PREssES STOPPED 312 (1996). 
63 See RUDENSTINE, supra note 62, at 342-43. It is not clear why the newspapers were 
not prosecuted, since more than a trutiority of the Supreme Court Justices had indicated that 
its refusal to enjoin publication was not dispositive on that issue. Neither Attorney General 
fohn Mitchell nor Solicitor General Erwin Griswold thought a criminal case against the 
papers was winnable and, as Rudenstine explains, that could have been sufficient. See id. at 
343. "But it may also be that the Nixon administration decided not to prosecute the 
newspapers in order to avoid a confrontation with the news media during Nixon's reelection 
bid." /d. 
64 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974) (precluding liability 
without fault and punitive damages without actual malice). 
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hardened. Gone was the "deference" of his Rosenbloom concurrence,65 
replaced by a tone of indignation, if not outrage, in his Gertz dissent. 66 His 
image of the press had crystallized: 
The communications industry has increasingly become concentrated in a few 
powerful hands operating very lucrative businesses reaching across the Nation 
and into almost every home. Neither the industry as a whole nor its individual 
components are easily intimidated, and we are fortunate that they are not. 
Requiring them to pay for the occasional damage they do to private reputation 
will play no substantial part in their future performance or their existence.67 
Writing separately in another case decided the same day, Justice White 
referred again to Gertz and the press: 
To me it is a near absurdity to so deprecate individual dignity, as the Court 
does in Gertz, and to leave the people at the complete mercy of the press, at 
least in this stage of our history when the press, as the majority in this case so 
well documents, is steadily becoming more powerful and much less likely to be 
deterred by threats of libel suits. 68 
Professing to "continue to subscribe to New York Times [Co. v. Sullivan] 
and those decisions extending its protection to defamatory falsehoods about 
public persons," Justice White said his quarrel lay with the Court's willingness 
"to find in the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan doctrine an infinite elasticity. "69 
Gertz, he said, "is the latest manifestation of the destructive potential of any 
good idea carried out to its logical extreme. "70 
That refusal to adopt an expansive reading of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan doctrine, even within the confines of libel law, carried over into the 
65 See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 60 (White, J., concurring). 
66 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 369 (White, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 390-91 (footnote omitted). Justice White's view of the press had begun to 
change even before Gertz. Vincent Blasi pointed out that earlier in Branzburg v. Hayes, 
Justice White "characterized the press as a private-interest group rather than an institution 
with a central function to perform in the constitutional system of checks and balances" and 
"labeled the source relationships that reporters sought to maintain 'a private system of 
informers operated by the press to report on criminal conduct' [cautioning] that this system 
would be 'unaccountable to the public' were a reporter's privilege to be recognized." Vincent 
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521, 
593, cited in LEE C. BOWNGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESs 54 (1991). 
68 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 263 (1974) (White, J., 
concurring). 
69 Gertz, 418 U.S. at398-99 (White, J., dissenting). 
70 ld. 
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newsgathering cases that reached the Supreme Court during the next twenty-
five years. The first of these cases, however, was decided almost before the ink 
was dry on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and it is doubtful that the Court 
gave the new libel doctrine any thought at all in Zemel v. Rusk. 71 
Zemel had sought to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba as a 
tourist. 72 When his request was denied, he renewed it, this time asldng for 
permission to travel "to satisfy my curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba 
and to make me a better informed citizen. "73 Refused again, Zemel challenged 
the Secretary of State's authority to take such action.74 A three-judge district 
court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment, and the United 
States Supreme Court affirmed.75 
The Court rejected Zemel's contention that the refusal to validate his 
passport for Cuba infringed upon his First Amendment right to inform 
himself.76 
For to the extent that the Secretary's refusal to validate passports for Cuba acts 
as an inhibition . . . it is an inhibition of action. There are few restrictions on 
action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of 
decreased data flow. . . . The right to speak and publish does not carry with it 
the unrestrained right to gather information?? 
Ample reasons exist for considering Zemel as something other than a bona 
fide newsgathering case. State Department policy at the time contemplated 
exemptions for bona fide journalists, among others,78 and Zemel's desire to 
"inform himself' seems as disingenuous now as it obviously did to the Court 
then. Still, the Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment rights of the 
press and public are coextensive;79 Zemel did not have to attend journalism 
school to gather news and information. 
71 381 u.s. 1 (1965). 
72 See id. at 3. 
73 !d. at4. 
74 Seeid. 
75 See id. at 3, 5. 
76 See id. at 16. 
77 !d. at 16-17. 
78 See id. at 3. 
79 See irifra note 92 and accompanying text. The concept of First Amendment protection 
for newsgathering put forward by this Article does not rely on special institutional rights for 
the press, so that topic will be reserved for another day. For a discussion of the press's 
institutional rights, see Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HAsTINGs L.J. 631 (1975), and the 
response of Chief Justice Burger in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797-8(12 
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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More importantly, the Court recognized that the Secretary's interference 
with the flow of information about Cuba was "a factor to be considered in 
determining whether [Zemel] has been denied due process of law. "80 As Justice 
Stewart would later point out, the rule at issue in Zemel was justified by the 
"weightiest considerations of national security."81 Justice Stewart also noted 
that the Court's use of the word "unrestrained" to characterize unprotected 
newsgathering necessarily implies that "some right to gather information does 
exist. "82 If Zemel affords any guidance on the right to gather news, it is that the 
government's interest in restricting travel must be balanced against the public's 
interest in the flow of information. 
The case that sent Justice Stewart back to Zemel, Braml:Jurg v. Hayes, 
reached the Court between Rosenbloom and Gertz. In each of the three cases 
consolidated under that caption, the Court refused to allow a reporter to protect 
his confidential sources by refusing to testify before a grand jury. 83 Although 
unanimous in concluding that the First Amendment afforded some protection 
for newsgathering, the Court was deeply divided as to the scope of that 
protection. 
Writing for a plurality of four, Justice White penned the phrase that would 
ever after be quoted by those who sought an expansive reading: "We do not 
question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country's 
welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First 
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated. "84 
In Justice White's opinion, however, that protection did not include even a 
qualified testimonial privilege to protect confidential sources. 85 Calling that a 
"crabbed view" of the First Amendment, 86 three dissenters endorsed a three-
part test for determining when reporters could be compelled to disclose their 
confidences. 87 Justice Powell's concurring opinion interpreted the Court's 
opinion as, in fact, requiring courts to strike "a proper balance between 
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony 
80 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16. 
81 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Zemel, 
381 U.S. at 16--17). 
82Jd. 
83 See id. at 667. 
84 /d. at 681. 
85 See id. at 690. 
86 /d. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.). Justice 
Douglas dissented separately. 
87 See id. at 743. 
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with respect to criminal conduct. "88 
Thus, although Bramburg has been cited both to affirm and deny a First 
Amendment right to protect confidential sources, 89 there were five votes for a 
right of some sort-four for a balancing test and one for an absolute privilege.90 
Like Zemel, Bramburg offers an uncertain message, but it is not that the First 
Amendment affords no protection for newsgathering. Most state legislatures 
and lower courts that have considered a testimonial privilege have opted for 
some form of balancing_91 Perhaps some future Supreme Court will ratify that 
judgment; there is nothing in Bramburg to prevent it. 
Much of the Supreme Court's newsgathering jurisprudence has resulted 
from efforts by the press to establish a constitutional right of access to 
information. While less than successful, these cases hardly sounded a death 
knell for a constitutional right to gather news. A trio of prison access cases, for 
example, held that the press has no greater First Amendment right than the 
general public to access information controlled by the government. 92 But the 
holding in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., that the First Amendment did not afford 
either the press or the public a right of access to information controlled by the 
government,93 was endorsed by only four justices. 
The issue in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., however, was far narrower than the 
plurality's sweeping dictum, and Justice Stewart, who cast the fourth vote for 
the judgment, would have recognized a new constitutional mandate: once the 
government has "opened its doors," the press and the public must have equally 
88 !d. at 710 (Powell, J ., concurring); see also infra text accompanying note 191. 
89 Compare Justice White's interpretation in Cohen, see infra text accompanying notes 
191-99, with Justice Brennan's order inln re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1315 (1980), expressing 
the view that Branzburg stands for the proposition that the First Amendment provides some 
degree of protection for reporter's confidences. 
90 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at711-12 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
91 Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted reporters' shield laws. 
See Confidential Sources & Info171Ultion, NEWs MEDIA & L., Fall1993, at 2, 3. Case law 
recognizing some form of the privilege is available in 18 states that do not have shield laws, 
two states have neither shield laws nor reported case law concerning the privilege, and one 
state supreme court has rejected the privilege. For a complete jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
review, see James Goodale & JohnS. Kiernan, Reporter's Privilege, 2 COMMUNICATIONS 
LAw 1996 at 955 (Practicing L. Inst. ed., 1996). See also So You've Been Subpoenaed . .. , 
NEWS MEDIA&L., Fall1993, at4. 
92 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 
417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974). But see Timothy B. 
Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. cn.1 (19m.) 
(arguing for a superior right of access for the press under certain circumstances). 
93 See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). 
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"effective access" to the infonnation that was revealed.94 To Justice Stewart, 
who believed that "freedom of the press" implied special institutional rights,95 
the First Amendment gave KQED the right to televise any areas of the Alameda 
County Jail that the public was allowed to visit.96 
The Court quickly put to rest any notion that the Constitution required 
effective access for broadcast media. In Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc., the Court denied broadcasters physical access to the infamous Watergate 
tapes that had been played in open court. 97 But the larger issue of access would 
ultimately be decided in favor of the press. In 1980, Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia held that, under certain circumstances and within certain 
bounds, the First Amendment may indeed require the government to afford the 
press and public access to infonnation, namely the right to attend criminal 
trials.98 
In Gannett v. DePasquale, the Court found no Sixth Amendment right for 
the public to attend criminal proceedings, but left open the question of a First 
Amendment right.99 Richmond Newspapers settled the matter. It was, wrote 
Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion, the first time that the Court had 
"squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any 
constitutional protection whatsoever."100 Even so, the holding was carefully 
limited, 101 and it took several more cases to define the right of access with 
respect to criminal proceedings.102 The Court has rejected a right of access to 
participants in a criminal trial, 103 and has yet to rule on access to civil trials.104 
Apart from the access cases, the Supreme Court considered relatively few 
94 Id. at 16-18 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
95 See id.; see also Stewart, supra note 79, at 631. 
96 See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 18-19 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
97 See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978). 
98 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). 
99 See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979). 
100 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
101 "[O]ur holding today does not mean that the First Amendment rights of the public 
and representatives of the press are absolute .... [A] trial judge, in the interest of the fair 
administration of justice, [may] impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial." ld. at 581 
n.18. 
102 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (recognizing a 
qualified right of access to pretrial hearings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 
U.S. 501 (1984) (recognizing a qualified right of access to voir dire); Globe Newspaper Co. 
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (striking down a Massachusetts statute that required 
courtrooms to be closed during the testimony of minor victims of sexual offenses). 
103 See KPNX Broad. Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, 459 U.S. 1302 (1982). 
104 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 ("Whether the public has a right to 
attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case."). 
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newsgathering questions during the 1970s and 1980s. In Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily, the Court upheld the prerogative of police to obtain a search warrant for 
evidence of criminal activity thought to be in the possession of journalists.105 
Writing for the majority, Justice White rejected the argument that the First 
Amendment required police to use a subpoena duces tecum except where there 
was reason to believe the evidence might be destroyed or removed and a 
restraining order would be futile.106 Following the opinion, and Justice White's 
tacit invitation, 107 Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act of 1980108 
requiring subpoenas in all but the most urgent circumstances. 
Another case, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 109 bears mentioning here 
because, although it is not strictly speaking a newsgathering case, it has been 
cited by lower courts to deprive journalists of access to discovery materials.110 
In that case, the Court upheld a protective order that prevented the Seattle 
Times from publishing information it had obtained through discovery in 
litigation to which it was a party, although the decision explicitly declined to 
preclude dissemination of the information if obtained by the press from other 
sources .Ill 
Thus, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence was marked by a reluctance to 
extend to newsgathering the same kind of First Amendment protection afforded 
dissemination, but, ultimately, some kind of rough balance emerged. It came in 
the form of a constitutional mandate, as in Richmond Newspapers, or a 
legislative reaction, as in Zurcher, or both, as in Branzburg. In time, a broad 
constitutional rule might have emerged, but not until the Court chose to review 
a decision applying state tort law or tort-like causes of action to impose liability 
on newsgatherers. 
One might have expected Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, in which the 
Court applied the actual malice standard to a complaint alleging intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, 112 to serve as a model for that kind of case. The 
well-known and politically active Reverend Jerry Falwell had been mercilessly 
and tastelessly parodied in a pornographic magazine.ll3 A jury rejected his libel 
105 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978). 
106 See id. at 563-65. 
107 See id. at 567. 
108 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
109 467 u.s. 20 (1984). 
llO See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 192 
(S.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that a magazine could not publish confidential material from a 
motion to amend which it had obtained illegally); infra notes 353-69 and accompanying text. 
111 See Seattle Tzmes, 467 U.S. at 37. 
112 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
113 See id. at 48. 
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action, on the ground that the "parody could not 'reasonably be understood as 
describing ... actual events,'" but awarded him $200,000 in compensatory 
and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.114 That 
award was affirmed on appeal, 115 but a unanimous Supreme Court reversed.116 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Falwell's argument 
that the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan need not be 
applied to a tort claim that did not seek redress for reputational damage.117 
Citing the vulnerability such a holding would create for political cartoonists,118 
the Chief Justice concluded that public figures like Falwell would have to show 
both a false statement of fact and actual malice to recover.119 Such a standard, 
he said, "is necessary to give adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms 
protected by the First Amendment. "120 
Although he concurred in the judgment, Justice White wrote separately to 
question what New York Times Co. v. Sullivan had to do with this case.121 
Justice White's reluctance to extend New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in Hustler 
would presage his position in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., which cut short the 
natural evolution of First Amendment protection for newsgathering and set the 
stage for many wrongheaded opinions coming out of the lower courts today. 
ill. COHEN V. COWLES MEDIA Co. 
Dan Cohen was a Minneapolis public relations executive122 associated with 
the 1982 gubernatorial campaign of Independent-Republican Wheelock 
Whitney.l23 In late October 1982, just six days before the general election, 
Cohen contacted a number of journalists in the St. Paul-Minneapolis area, 
114 !d. at49. 
115 See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th Cir. 1986). 
116 See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision. 
117 See id. at 52-53. 
118 See id. at 53. 
119 See id. at 56. 
120 !d. 
121 See id. at 57 (White, J., concurring). Throughout oral argument in Hustler, Justice 
White sought a way to avoid applying New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to the case. First, he 
urged the magazine's counsel to concede that his case turned on the proposition that a parody 
of a public figure was never actionable, absent a false statement of fact, then he challenged 
Falwell's counsel to explain why, if this cartoon did indeed contain a false statement of fact, 
his libel claim failed. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWEll V. LARRY FLYNT 270, 280, 
284 (1988). 
122 See Bill Salisbury, Burning the Source, WASH. JoURNALISM REv., Sept. 1991, at 
18. 
123 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991). 
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offering to give them information concerning a Democratic-Farmer-Laborite 
("DFL") candidate in exchange for a promise of confidentiality.124 Among the 
journalists accepting the offer were reporters for the St. Paul Pioneer Press and 
the Minneapolis Star Tribune.125 
Cohen provided the reporters with public court records showing that 
Marlene Johnson, the DFL candidate for Lieutenant Governor, had previously 
been arrested for unlawful assembly and petit theft. 126 The unlawful assembly 
charges, which grew out of a civil rights demonstration, were ultimately 
dismissed.127 The candidate had been convicted on the theft charge, which 
involved a minor shoplifting offense while she had been emotionally distraught, 
but the conviction was later vacated.12s 
Editors at both the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star Tribune 
independently decided to print the story and, over their reporters' protests, to 
include the name of the source.129 While the Pioneer Press editors buried Dan 
Cohen's name deep in the story, the Star Tribune editors featured it, apparently 
reasoning that the value of the story, if any, lay in Cohen's conduct, not 
Johnson's.130 The Star Tribune also attacked Cohen in its editorial pages, 131 but 
neither paper reported that it had broken a promise of confidentiality with 
Cohen.132 
When the story broke, Cohen lost his jobl33 and later sued the newspapers' 
publishers alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.134 
Overcoming the publishers' First Amendment claims, Cohen won $200,000 in 
compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages at trial.135 The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals struck down the punitive damage award after 
124 See Salisbury, supra note 122, at 19-20. According to Salisbury, the Pioneer Press 
reporter involved, Cohen refused even to describe the information until he received a promise 
of confidentiality. See id. at 20. 
125 See id. Associated Press reporter Gerry Nelson and WCCO-TV reporter Dave 
Nimmer also received the information. See id. Nelson's stories did not name Cohen, while 
Nimmer decided the story was not newsworthy. See id. at 20-21. 
126 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665. 
127 Seeid. 
128 See id. at 665-66. 
129 See Salisbury, supra note 122, at 21. 
130 See id. at 21-22. 
131 See id. at 22. 
132 See id. 
133 Cohen said he was fired, and that position is adopted by the Supreme Court. See 
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 666. His supervisor said he resigned. See Salisbury, supra note 122, at 
22. 
134 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 666. 
135 See id. 
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finding that Cohen had failed to establish a fraud claim.136 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court struck down the compensatory damage award, holding a 
contract action "inappropriate" under the circumstances.137 
During oral argument before the Minnesota Supreme Court, one of the 
justices asked a question about equitable estoppel.138 In addressing that issue, 
the court found it necessary to "balance the constitutional rights of a free press 
against the common law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity. "139 In 
this case, the court said, enforcing the promise would violate the newspapers' 
First Amendment rights.140 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 
"to consider the First Amendment implications of this case. "141 
Writing for a five to four majority,142 Justice White rejected the 
newspapers' argument that this case was controlled by the line of cases holding 
that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish 
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the 
highest order. "143 Instead, Justice White said, the case was controlled "by the 
equally well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws 
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against 
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. "144 
Justice White proceeded to list a number of cases, each of which will be 
discussed below, purporting to demonstrate that enforcement of general laws 
against the press is not subject to any "stricter scrutiny than would be applied to 
enforcement against other persons or organizations. "145 Finding Minnesota's 
136 See id. (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989)). 
137 See id. (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990)). 
138 See id. at 666-67. "Apparently," Justice White said, "a promissory estoppel theory 
was never tried to the jury ... nor argued by the parties." /d. White went on to deny that it 
made any difference to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, as the newspapers claimed, since the 
state supreme court had decided the issue as a matter of federal constitutional law. See id. at 
667-68. 
139 Cohen, 451 N.W.2d at 205. 
140 See id. 
141 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 667. 
142 Dissenting opinions were written by Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Marshall 
and Souter joined, and Justice Souter, with whom Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and 
O'Connor joined. See id. at 672, 676. 
143 /d. at 668-69 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g, 443 U.S. CJ7, 103 (1CJ79)). 
144 /d. at 669. 
145 /d. at 669-70. If this quotation is read as merely refusing to recognize a distinction 
between the institutional press and the general public, it says nothing about the level of 
scrutiny required when a tort is committed in the act of gathering news. 
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doctrine of promissory estoppel just such a "law of general applicability," 
Justice White had no problem applying it to the press.146 He even suggested 
that the newspapers' breaking their promises might serve as a predicate for 
finding their conduct unlawful, thus arguably negating First Amendment 
protection for the information itself.147 
Justice White further distinguished Cohen's situation from that of a pbmtiff 
seeking to avoid the "strict requirements" for establishing a libel claim by 
stating an alternative cause of action.148 Specifically citing Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell, where the Court denied a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress without a showing of actual malice, Justice White pointed out 
that Cohen had not sought damages for injury to his reputation or state of mind, 
but rather for the loss of his job and his lowered earning capacity .149 
Finally, Justice White tackled the argument that allowing the promissory 
estoppel claim would inhibit the press from disclosing the identity of a 
confidential source when, as in Cohen, that information is newsworthy .150 If 
true, he said, the "chilling effect" would be "no more than the incidental, and 
constitutionally insignificant, consequence of applying to the press a generally 
applicable law that requires those who make certain kinds of promises to keep 
them. "151 This analysis begins with the core concept of that masterpiece of 
circular reasoning: the supremacy of generally applicable law. 
146 !d. at 670. 
147 See id. at 671. Justice White did not say that a finding of unlawful newsgathering, 
without more, would justify a prior restraint on publication. Indeed, his opinion in the 
Pentagon Papers case suggests he would not go quite that far. But other courts have certainly 
adopted that interpretation, and Justice White's language certainly leaves the possibility open. 
For a full discussion of the notion that illegal conduct in newsgathering removes First 
Amendment protection from publication of the truthful information thereby obtained, see infra 
Partiii.B. 
148 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671. 
149 See id. Nowhere does Justice White explain how these injuries differ. Cohen lost his 
job because he tried to "sandbag" an opponent, or because he got caught trying. Either way, 
his injury was reputational. Nor does Justice White explain why the difference, if any, 
justifies the distinction. One commentator has speculated that Justice White may have 
believed the distinction to lie in the different degrees of the "chilling effect" resulting from the 
relatively contained contract damages Cohen was awarded and the virtually unlimited tort 
damages that Falwell was denied. See Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of 
Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 83 (1995). 
150 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671-72. 
151 !d. The Court remanded Cohen to the Minnesota Supreme Court which ultimately 
affirmed a $200,000 judgment for compensatory damages. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
479 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1992). 
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A. Laws of General Applicability 
The chief doctrine upon which Justice White relies in Cohen, the doctrine 
of general applicability, may be articulated as follows: as long as a law of 
general applicability-e.g., tax, antitrust, or fair employment law-was not 
designed to infringe on a fundamental right-e.g., single out the press for 
special treatment-then any burden the law might impose on that fundamental 
right is merely incidental and of no constitutional significance.152 
In reciting the cases that support his theory, Justice White included several 
that involve laws that can be fairly categorized as general economic regulations, 
with no direct bearing on journalistic activities.153 As a group, these appear to 
pose only the most attenuated threat to established First Amendment rights and, 
therefore, show the doctrine in its most innocuous and apparently acceptable 
form. 
1. General Economic Regulations 
In Associated Press v. NLRB, 154 the wire service had discharged an 
editorial employee, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, for union 
organizing and agitating for collective bargaining.155 The National Labor 
Relations Board ordered it to cease its anti-union practices and reinstate the 
fired employee, and, when the Associated Press ("AP") refused to comply, the 
court of appeals issued a decree enforcing the order.156 
In its brief to the United States Supreme Court, the Associated Press 
argued, inter alia, that ordering the employee's reinstatement was tantamount to 
giving the NLRB editorial control of the newspaper .157 The Court rejected that 
contention out of hand, noting that the NLRB's order in no way circumscribed 
the service's freedom to publish the news as it saw fit and that the service was 
152 At one point, Justice White states the principle this way: "[G]enerally applicable 
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press 
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news." Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669. At 
another point, he finds any inhibition on truthful reporting resulting from this decision "no 
more than the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of applying to the 
press a generally applicable law." !d. at 672. There is no inquiry, in Justice White's view, 
into how burdensome the effects of the law on newsgathering might be. 
153 See id. at 669. 
154 301 u.s. 103 (1937). 
155 See id. at 123-25. 
156 See id. at 124. 
157 See Brief for Petitioner, 1937 U.S. LEXIS 1192, at *21-24, Associated Press v. 
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). 
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free to discharge any editorial employee who failed to comply with its editorial 
policies.158 In reaching that conclusion, the Court pointed out that 
[t]he business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it 
is an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no special 
immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to 
invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be 
punished for contempt of court. He is subject to the antitrust laws. Like others 
he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business.159 
The Court seemed to justify its application of this general law against the 
wire service by insisting that the AP retained the ability to "publish the news as 
it desires it published. "160 This at least suggests that the Court might have found 
otherwise if the freedom to publish were in fact curtailed to some unspecified 
degree by applying the law. It is also instructive that the Court looked upon 
state libel laws as similar laws of general applicability, especially in view of 
Justice White's attempt in Cohen to distinguish them.161 
The connection between the valid application of a general law and the 
continued right to publish freely, which the Court seemed to find in Associated 
Press v. NLRB, is clarified and emphasized in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. 
v. Walling)62 In affirming the right of the Department of Labor to subpoena 
the records of a newspaper publisher in a Fair Labor Standards Act 
investigation,163 the Court held that "[t]he [First] Amendment does not forbid 
this or other regulation which ends in no restraint upon expression or in any 
other evil outlawed by its terms and purposes. "164 There is no suggestion that 
such a restraint would be merely an "incidental" and "constitutionally 
insignificant" burden.165 Indeed, the Court views such a restraint as an "evil" 
that is "outlawed" by the First Amendment's "terms and purposes." 166 
In the antitrust area, Justice White first cites Associated Press v. United 
158 See Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 133. 
159 /d. at 132-33 (footnotes omitted). 
160 /d. at 133. 
161 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671. The inclusion of libel as a law of general applicability 
in Associated Press reinforces Justice O'Connor's assertion that "(t]here is nothing talismanic 
about neutral laws of general applicability." Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of 
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoted in Cohen, 501 
U.S. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting)). 
162 327 u.s. 186 (1946). 
163 See id. at 188-89, 218. 
164 /d. at 193. 
165 Cohen, 501 U.S. at672. 
166 Walling, 327 U.S. at 193. 
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States,161 in which the Supreme Court struck down AP's by-laws as a restraint 
of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.16S Justice Black, perhaps the 
Court's most steadfast defender of the First Amendment, declared that "[t]he 
fact that the publisher handles news while others handle food does 
not ... afford the publisher a peculiar constitutional sanctuary in which he can 
with impunity violate laws regulating his business practices. "169 
167 326 u.s. 1 (1945). 
168 See id. at 12-13. Justice Black deftly turned the Associated Press's own First 
Amendment argument against it: 
Finally, the argument is made that to apply the Sherman Act to this association of 
publishers constitutes an abridgment of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. Perhaps it would be a sufficient answer to this contention to refer to the 
decisions of this Court in Associated Press v. Lobar Board and Indiana Fanner's Guide 
Co. v. Prairie Fanner Co. It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for 
freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read 
as a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom. The First 
Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, 
here provides powerful reasons to the contraiy. That Amendment rests on the 
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a 
condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede 
the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they 
impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish 
means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the 
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of 
the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction 
repression of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the 
slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views 
has any constitutional immunity. 
/d. at 19-20 (citations omitted). In a footnote, Black added: 
It is argued that the decree interferes with freedom "to print as and how one's reason or 
one's interest dictates." The decree does not compel AP or its members to permit 
publication of anything which their "reason" tells them should not be published. It only 
provides that after their "reason" has permitted publication of news, they shall not, for 
their own financial advantage, unlawfully combine to limit its publication. The only 
compulsion to print which appears in the record is found in the By-Laws, previously set 
out, which compel members of the Association to print some AP news or subject 
themselves to fine or expulsion from membership in the Association. 
/d. at 20 n.18. 
169 /d. at7. 
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This reference to "business practices" became even more clearly a 
limitation in Justice White's second-referenced antitrust case, Citizen Publishing 
Co. v. United States. 170 In striking down a joint operating agreement between 
Tucson, Arizona's only two daily newspapers as violating both the Sherman 
Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act, 171 Justice Douglas-the Court's other First 
Amendment "absolutist" -wrote that the restraints imposed by joint operating 
agreements cannot be justified by the First Amendment.172 Additionally, Justice 
Douglas stated that "[n]either news gathering nor news dissemination is being 
regulated by the present decree. It deals only with restraints on certain business 
or commercial practices. "173 Not only did Justice Douglas confine the valid 
application of this general law to "business or commercial practices," but he 
explicitly referred to "news gathering" as a presumably protected activity that 
was not threatened by enforcing the law.174 
Finally, turning to the tax code, Justice White cites Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania115 and Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota 
Cormnissioner of Revenue116 to support his contention that laws of general 
applicability do not implicate the First Amendment.177 It is difficult to see why 
he thought these cases supported his position. Both struck down ostensibly 
neutral taxes and, as will be shown, provide even stronger evidence than the 
others that the doctrine of general applicability is misconceived. 
In Murdock, the Court barred the application to Jehovah's Witnesses of an 
ordinance imposing a flat tax on "all persons canvassing for or 
soliciting ... orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares, or merchandise of 
any kind. "178 As applied, Justice Douglas characterized the tax as a "license 
tax ... imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. "179 
Justice Douglas made it quite clear that his holding applied equally under the 
press and free exercise clauses: "The taxes imposed by this ordinance can 
hardly help but be as severe and telling in their impact on the freedom of the 
press and religion as the 'taxes on knowledge' at which the First Amendment 
was partly aimed." 18° 
170 394 u.s. 131 (1969). 
171 See id. at 133-35. 
172 See id. at 139. 
173 !d. 
174 !d. 
175 319 u.s. 105 (1943). 
176 460 u.s. 575 (1983). 
177 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). 
178 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106-07, 114-17. 
179 /d. at 113. 
180 !d. at 114-15. 
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Moreover, it made no difference to Justice Douglas that the ordinance 
applied to peddlers as well as preachers: 
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The 
protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax 
certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the 
privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and 
merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality 
in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.181 
Justice Douglas does say in passing that neither religious groups nor the press 
"are free from all financial burdens of government,"182 but the case hardly 
supports Justice White's proposition that the "media ... must pay 
nondiscriminatory taxes." 183 
In Minneapolis Star, the Court struck down a use tax imposed on the cost 
of paper and ink consumed in the newspaper production process.184 Although 
the tax had no more sinister purpose than to serve as a surrogate for the state's 
general sales tax, an exemption for smaller newspapers resulted in the Star 
Tribune's bearing a disproportionate burden.185 
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor paid lip service to the limited 
expression of the doctrine of general applicability found in the labor and 
antitrust cases: "Clearly, the First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation 
of the press. It is beyond dispute that the States and the Federal Government 
can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without 
creating constitutional problems. "186 However, Minnesota Star really stands for 
the proposition that even such neutral economic regulations as sales and use 
taxes may be found constitutionally infirm where First Amendment values may 
be jeopardized.187 
181 ld. at 115. 
182 !d. at 112. 
183 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (citing Murdock, 319 U.S. 
at 112, and Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 581-83). 
184 See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592-93. 
185 See id. at 578-79. 
186 ld. at 581. 
187 Of course, it may be difficult to say just when those values are jeopardized. See, 
e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (exempting certain media from a 
generally applicable, content-neutral sales tax does not violate the First Amendment where 
there is no likelihood that the tax will stifle the free exchange of ideas); Texas Monthly, Inc. 
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1989) (extending state general sales tax to religious 
publications does not restrain the free exercise of religion where it is not a flat license or 
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Thus, the cases Justice White cites in Cohen support a far less imposing 
doctrine than the outcome would suggest. Those discussed so far concede only 
that economic regulations of general applicability may be imposed on 
businesses engaged in First Amendment activities, including newsgathering and 
dissemination, provided the integrity of those activities is never threatened. 
These cases have nothing to say about laws that do not constitute economic 
regulation, but which still may be applied to obstruct newsgathering or stifle 
publication of truthful information, such as Minnesota's law of promissory 
estoppel. 
2. Nonregulatory Laws 
In his litany of cases supporting the doctrine of generally applicable 
laws, 188 Justice White cites only two cases involving state law unrelated to 
business regulation: Branzburg v. Hayes189 and Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co.19D Apart from their link to Cohen, these opinions have two 
other elements in common: both opinions were written by Justice White and 
both have been largely confined to their own facts. 
Justice White wrote a plurality opinion in Branzburg expressing the view 
that the First Amendment afforded journalists no special privilege to protect the 
identity of confidential sources or information received in confidence by 
refusing to testify before a grand jury .191 His argument began with an 
articulation of the general applicability doctrine: "It is clear that the First 
Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that 
may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general 
applicability." 192 In support, Justice White cited several of the same cases he 
would later cite in Cohen, 193 as well as others involving economic regulation of 
media businesses.194 
occupation tax and poses little threat to religious activity). 
188 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669. 
189 408 u.s. 665 (1972). 
190 433 u.s. 562 (1977). 
191 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-92. 
192 /d. at 682. 
193 See id. at683 (citing CitizenPubl'g Co. v. United. States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969); 
Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946); Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943); 
Associated. Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). 
194 See id. (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (antitrust 
law); Mabee v. White Plains Publ'g Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (labor and employment law); 
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (tax law); Indiana Farmer's Guide 
Publ'g Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publ'g Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934) (antitrust law)). 
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Justice White went on to point out that the press is also subject to 
limitations imposed by state libel laws, may be punished for contempt, and has 
no constitutional right to information not available to the public generally .195 In 
none of these areas, however, could he say, as he would hold in Cohen, that 
First Amendment considerations played no role in how these constraints were 
applied. For example, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 196 which Justice White 
cited first in a list of libel cases, 197 put such an array of First Amendment 
qualifiers on state libel law that Justice White himself would later question its 
wisdom.I98 Moreover, at least some form of First Amendment balancing will 
often take place before a contempt citation or access restriction is imposed on 
the press.199 
However, there is no need to challenge Justice White's examples to negate 
Branzburg as authority for Cohen's expression of the general applicability 
doctrine. Justice White himself undermined that authority by imposing a 
constitutional caveat in Branzburg: 
[N]ewsgathering is not without its First Amendment protections, and grand 
jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would 
pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment. Official 
harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to 
disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no 
justification. Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas to 
motions to quash. We do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must 
operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth.200 
That caveat was broadened by Justice Powell's influential (some would say 
controlling) concurring opinion.2o1 Justice Powell reiterated White's 
195 See id. at 683-85. 
196 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
197 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 683-84. 
198 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. 
199 With respect to contempt, see, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 
1353 (1st Cir. 1986) (reversing a contempt conviction because the underlying court order was 
an unconstitutional prior restraint). As for access, see, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (holding the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in 
the guarantees of the First Amendment). 
200 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08 (footnote omitted). 
201 See id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). Lucas Powe says Branzburg "was the 
case that began the press's transformation of Justice Powell into the Sainted Lewis (only a 
slight exaggeration) by the time he was to be replaced by the mephistophelean Robert Bark." 
POWE, supra note 31, at 182. In fact, Professor Powe finds "nothing inconsistent" between 
the opinions of Justices White and Powell in Branzburg: "[H]ard and fast rules could be 
avoided, but in individual cases, when a source deserved protection, a judge might grant it." 
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admonition, then moved beyond the "good faith" test Justice White suggested 
to endorse a protective order where the information sought bears "only a 
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if [the 
journalist] has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates 
confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law 
enforcement. "202 In addition, Justice Powell stated: 
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a 
proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens 
to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of 
these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords 
with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.Z03 
Precisely what factors go into that balancing varies from circuit to circuit 
and from state to state, but some balancing requirement can be found in nearly 
every jurisdiction. 204 
Thus, Bran:zburg stands, not for the implication in Cohen that requiring the 
press to comply with generally applicable laws of evidence has no First 
Amendment significance, but for the proposition that imposing these generally 
applicable laws on the press must be carefully balanced against its First 
Amendment rights. 
Finally, in Cohen, Justice White cites Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co. to support the undeniable proposition that "[t]he press, like 
others interested in publishing, may not publish copyrighted material without 
obeying the copyright laws. "205 In Zacchini, the Court reversed the Ohio 
Supreme Court's holding that a First Amendment privilege prevented a circus 
performer from recovering damages from a television station that taped and 
aired his entire fifteen-second "human cannonball" performance without his 
consent.206 Since Zacchini had little to do with copyright infringement,207 but 
!d. at 183. Perhaps, but the vast majority of courts that have considered the issue appear to 
recognize in Justice Powell's opinion something much closer to Justice Stewart's 
constitutional balancing test than to Justice White's endorsement of a court's inherent 
authority to prevent prosecutorial abuse. 
202 Bral12}Jurg, 408 U.S. at 710. 
203 /d. 
204 See supra note 91. 
205 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,576-79 (1(}77)). 
206 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563-66. 
207 The Court of Appeals of Ohio found infiingement of a common law copyright, but 
the Ohio Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court based their decisions squarely 
on the "right of publicity" claim. See id. at 564-65. 
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rather involved a state tort law claim for appropriating the "right of 
publicity, "208 both causes of action should be examined. As has been true in all 
previous cases, one finds that, in applying either of these laws of general 
applicability to the press, courts are constrained by First Amendment 
considerations. 
In Zacchini, Justice White cited three federal district court decisions that 
"rejected First Amendment challenges to the federal copyright law on the 
ground that 'no restraint [has been] placed on the use of an idea or 
concept.'"209 Then, oddly, he reminded the reader that "[Zacchim] does not 
involve a claim that respondent would be prevented by petitioner's 'right of 
publicity' from staging or filming its own 'human cannonball' act. "210 Justice 
White dropped this line of reasoning, presumably believing his point was made, 
namely, that federal copyright law withstands First Amendment scrutiny. But 
his examples beg the real question here: Is there a First Amendment privilege to 
take someone else's performance (or words) without consent? 
Of course, there is such a privilege; it is known as "fair use" and it dates 
back at least to 1841 when Justice Story recognized the doctrine in a case 
involving George Washington's letters.211 The fact that it was ultimately 
208 Justice White made the connection by noting that the principle underlying the Ohio 
law protecting Zacchini's right of publicity, namely, to provide him an economic incentive to 
entertain the public, also underlies federal patent and copyright law. 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents 
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain 
is the best way to advap.ce public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve 
rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 
!d. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)). 
209 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 577 n.13 (quoting United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 
1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974)). He also refers to Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F. 
Supp. 108, 115-16 (N.D. Cal. 1972), and Robert Stigwood Group Lid. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. 
Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1972), both of which rely on Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright 
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 
1180 (1970). 
210 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at578 n.13. 
211 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), discussed in 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985). According to 
Justice Story: 
[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be really and 
truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the other 
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codified within the Copyright Act of 1976212 does nothing to negate or alter its 
character as a judicially imposed limitation on copyright consistent with, if not 
compelled by, the First Amendment. 213 The contemporary case of Harper & 
hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most 'important parts of the work, with a 
view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use of the original work, and substitute the 
review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a piracy. 
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344-45. 
212 The Copyright Act of 1976 states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted 
work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 
use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (emphasis added). 
213 Earlier studies tend to see "fair use" as a judicial response to the internal logic of 
Congress's charge "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. For example, Horace Ball wrote: 
[T]he author's consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works ha[d] always been 
implied by the courts as a necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting the 
progress of science and useful arts, since a prohibition of such use would inhibit 
subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works and thus ... frustrate 
the very ends sought to be attained. 
HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGIIT AND l.JTERARy PROPERTY 260 (1944), quoted in 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). 
More modem analyses, with a more developed sense of First Amendment values, speak 
of striking the "difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control 
and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing 
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand." Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984}, quoted in Harper & Row, 
471 U.S. at 580 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is interesting, though not particularly relevant, 
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Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises quotes with approval the Second 
Circuit Court's assertion that fair use "strike[s] a definitional balance between 
the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication 
of facts while still protecting an author's expression. "214 
Again, the Court recognized, not that laws of general applicability may be 
applied to the press without considering the First Amendment implications, but 
that the interests to be protected by those laws must be balanced against First 
Amendment values before they can be so applied. And what is true of copyright 
law is equally true of the "right of publicity" tort at issue in Zacchini. 
Nearly twenty years later, Zacchini remains the only "right of publicity" 
case reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. It is widely interpreted to 
hold that the First Amendment does not require states to provide a 
"newsworthiness" defense or any other balancing requirement.215 But Zacchini 
says only that the First Amendment did not compel Ohio to let the press 
broadcast Zacchini's entire performance: "Wherever the line in particular 
situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that 
are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not 
immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his 
consent. "216 Justice White even distinguished Zacchini from the so-called 
"incidental use" cases that typically recognize a First Amendment privilege for 
use of a name or picture associated with a newsworthy story.217 
that Justice White joined Brennan's dissent in Harper & Row, a dissent that relied heavily on 
the need to temper the "proprietary right" bestowed by the copyright law in order to "ensure 
the progress of arts and sciences and the integrity of First Amendment values." Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 589-90. 
214 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
215 See, e.g., DoNALD M. GILLMORET AL., MAss COMMUNICATION LAW, CASES AND 
CoMMENr 329 (5th ed. 1990) ("The [Zacchim] Court held that the state might provide a 
newsworthiness defense on state law grounds but was not required to by the First 
Amendment."). 
216 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977). 
217 See id. at 576. Justice White quotes, with apparent approval, Dean Prosser's 
discussion of incidental use: 
The New York courts were faced very early with the obvious fact that newspapers and 
magazines, to say nothing of radio, television and motion pictures, are by no means 
philanthropic institutions, but are operated for profit. As against the contention that 
everything published by these agencies must necessarily be "for purposes of trade," they 
were compelled to hold that there must be some closer and more direct connection, 
beyond the mere fact that the newspaper itself is sold; and that the presence of 
advertising matter in adjacent columns, or even the duplication of a news item for the 
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That ZLlcchini does not foreclose a First Amendment balancing requirement 
is reinforced by Justice White's analogy to copyright cases,21s where any fair 
use analysis-i.e., balancing test-would also be dramatically, if not 
dispositively, influenced by the broadcaster's use of the entire film.219 Finally, 
Justice White himself seemed to confine his holding to ZLlcchini's unique facts: 
"We conclude that although the State of Ohio may as a matter of its own law 
privilege the press in the circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not require it to do so. "220 
Thus, in all of the cases cited by Justice White in Cohen, some kind of 
balancing was required. 221 His list was not exhaustive, however, and the 
doctrine of "general applicability" has found its most persuasive contemporary 
advocate in Justice Scalia, albeit in cases other than press clause cases. Two 
cases in particular, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith222 and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. ,223 bear analysis because 
they involve nonbusiness regulatory laws adversely affecting First Amendment 
rights. 
3. Nonbusiness Regulation 
In Employment Division, the Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court's 
purpose of advertising the publication itself, does not make any difference. Any other 
conclusion would in all probability have been an wzconstitutional interference with the 
freedom oftlze press. Accordingly, it has been held that the mere incidental mention of 
the plaintiff's name in a book or a motion picture is not an invasion of privacy; nor is the 
publication of a photograph or a newsreel in which he incidentally appears. 
!d. at 574 n.ll (quoting WllllAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 806-07 (4th ed. 1971)) 
(emphasis added). 
218 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
219 Keep in mind that the Court found a mere 300 words taken from the 200,000-word 
manuscript at issue in Harper & Row were sufficient to tip the third fair use factor, "[a]mount 
and [s]ubstantiality of the [p]ortion [u]sed," in favor of the copyright holder where those 300 
words formed "the most interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript." Harper & 
Row, 411 U.S. at 564-66. 
220 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578-79. 
221 In Cohen, Justice White also notes, without citing authority, that "[t]he press may 
not with impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news." Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). Absent any known breaking-and-entering cases in 
which a reporter raised a First Amendment defense, this "example" will be dealt with by 
analogy to trespass. See infra notes 428-31 and accompanying text. 
222 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
223 501 u.s. 560 (1991). 
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holding that the free exercise clause prohibited the state from denying 
unemployment benefits to persons discharged for using peyote, in violation of 
state criminal law, even where the use was an integral part of a religious 
ceremony.224 In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia Gained by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy) held that no balancing 
test was required to uphold generally applicable, religion-neutral criminal laws 
that had the effect of burdening a particular religious practice.225 
To support that position, Justice Scalia found it necessary to distinguish 
several cases holding otherwise by referring to the speech and press values that 
were also at issue in those "hybrid" cases.226 Absent those values or others,227 
in combination with the free exercise issue, no balancing test is required.228 
Thus, whatever else Employment Division means, it cannot be read to support 
the bald assertion that no balancing test need be applied to laws of general 
applicability that burden free speech or free press rights. 
Justice Scalia reserved that leap of logic for Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
in which he wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment that Indiana's 
prohibition on public nudity, as applied to nude dancing as entertainment, did 
not violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free expression.229 In that 
opinion, Justice Scalia broke with former allies Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Kennedy, who, with Justices O'Connor and Souter, applied the 
balancing test prescribed in United States v. O'Brien230 to reach their 
224 See Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 890. 
225 See id. at 884-85. 
226 See id. at 881 (citing Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576-78 (1944) 
(invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-17 (1943) (same); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable 
solicitations under which an administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he 
deemed nonreligious)). 
227 Scalia suggested that a hybrid might also be formed by combining free expression 
and the "right of parents ... to direct the education of their children." !d. at 882 (citing 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-
attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their 
children to school)). 
228 See id. at 881-85. 
229 See Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572-81 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
230 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The O'Brien test was stated as follows: 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power 
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
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conclusions. 231 
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, 
dissented, finding Indiana's law not one of general applicability, but rather one 
directly related to free expression. 232 As a result, Justice Scalia stood alone 
among those who would uphold the law in concluding: 
[T]he only First Amendment analysis applicable to laws that do not directly or 
indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of whether the purpose of the 
law is to suppress communication. If not, that is the end of the matter so far as 
First Amendment guarantees are concerned; if so, the court then proceeds to 
determine whether there is substantial justification for the proscription. 233 
There is no way to reconcile this view with O'Brien, and Justice Scalia 
conceded that the Court's "discussions" have not always supported his 
position. 234 What mattered, he suggested, is that the Court had "never 
invalidated the application of a general law simply because the conduct that it 
reached was being engaged in for expressive purposes and the government 
could not demonstrate a sufficiently important state interest. "235 
Justice Scalia may not have had the votes in Barnes, but his explanation 
must have impressed Justice White, for when Cohen was decided later that 
same month, Justice White had no trouble buying in and bringing along Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens. Thus, alone among speech and press 
clause precedents, Cohen makes no inquiry as to the value of revealing Dan 
Cohen's identity nor attempts to balance that value against Minnesota's law of 
promissory estoppel. 236 
to the furtherance of that interest. 
/d. at377, quotedinBarnes, 501 U.S. at567. 
231 Justice Souter wrote separately, identifying the state's interest as combating the 
secondary effects-like prostitution-of live nude dancing, rather than society's moral views. 
See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 583 (Souter, J., concurring). 
232 See id. at 590-93 {White, J., dissenting). 
233 /d. at 578 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 
622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en bane) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)). 
234 Seeid. 
235 /d. at 577. 
236 See David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws mul the First Amendment, 26 SW. U. 
L. REv. 201, 227-32 (1997). 
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4. Summary 
Justice White's list of the so-called laws of general applicability at issue in 
these precedents actually includes several different species of law. As noted 
above, economic regulation of business activity, the paradigm on which Justice 
White relies most heavily, is scrutinized, not only for motive,237 but also for 
effect,238 before it may be applied to the media. Regulation of other kinds of 
conduct is subject to so-called "intermediate scrutiny" whenever free speech is 
threatened. 239 First Amendment values have been judicially built into common 
law torts240 and their statutory equivalents.241 And even rules affecting the 
courts themselves are subject to some measure of First Amendment review.242 
Of all the types of law discussed above, Minnesota's law of promissory 
estoppel, as applied in Cohen, is most closely related to the common law torts. 
But for the contract-like limitation on damages, and correspondingly limited 
"chilling effect," it could have been a breach of confidence tort.243 Otherwise, 
Justice Blackmun was no doubt correct in regarding Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell as controlling precedent for judicially requiring First Amendment 
scrutiny in Cohen and, actual malice being reserved for false speech, in 
regarding Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. as providing the appropriate rule 
237 See, e.g., Grojean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-51 (1936) (striking 
down tax imposed almost exclusively on newspapers that opposed state government policies). 
238 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 591-93 (1983) (striking down a use tax imposed only on certain newspapers even 
without evidence of unconstitutional purpose). 
239 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1991) (upholding 
state ban on public nudity after applying the O'Brien test); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 376-77, 386 (1968) (upholding conviction for burning a draft card after applying a four-
part balancing test). But see Bogen, supra note 236, at 204 (proposing that O'Brien is "under 
attack"). 
240 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988) (extending 
the actual malice standard to intentional infliction of emotional distress); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
385 U.S. 374, 384-88 (1967) (extending the actual malice standard to invasion of privacy); 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964) (requiring a public official to 
prove actual malice before recovering for libel). 
241 See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1979) (barring 
statutory liability for the publication of truthful information, lawfully obtained, absent a state 
interest of the highest order); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 541-42 (1969) (subjecting news media use of copyrighted material to fair use analysis). 
242 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972) (making courts 
available to quash grand jury subpoenas served on news media without good reason). 
243 See Gilles, supra note 149, at 79-83. 
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to apply:244 "To the extent that truthful speech may ever be sanctioned 
consistent with the First Amendment, it must be in furtherance of a state interest 
'of the highest order.' "245 
Justice White's responses to Justice Blackmun included a spurious 
distinction between civil liability and "punishment," the dubious notion that 
First Amendment rights can be waived by something concededly less than a 
contract, and the meaningless truism that Cohen, unlike Falwell, was not trying 
to avoid constitutional libel standards.246 Justice White's antipathy toward those 
standards is well established, 247 but his attempted distinction missed the essence 
of Hustler and of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,248 in which those standards 
were first enunciated. 249 In both cases, the Court refused to punish speech that 
met all of the elements of a state-law tort because those elements were not 
sufficient to protect First Amendment interests.250 
Both the tort of libel and that of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
("TIED") could fairly be called laws of general applicability. And although libel 
law inherently implicates speech interests, TIED need not involve speech any 
more than promissory estoppel needs to involve speech.251 Still, the Court 
imposed the full protection of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan libel standards 
244 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 674-76 (1991) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
245 /d. at 676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 
u.s. 97, 103 (1979)). 
246 See id. at 670-71. Justice White even supports the latter response with a quote from 
the Minnesota Supreme Court that, by any logic, should cut the other way: "Cohen could not 
sue for defamation because the infonnation disclosed was true." ld. at 671. 
247 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369 (1974) (White, J., 
dissenting); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 262 (1974) (White, J., 
concurring). 
248 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
249 Indeed, Justice White finds "[t]he central meaning of New York 1imes [Co. v. 
Sullivan], and for me the First Amendment as it relates to libel laws, is that seditious libel-
criticism of government and public officials-falls beyond the police power of the state." 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 387 (White, J., dissenting). 
250 In Hustler, the Court explicitly declined to 
find that a State's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is sufficient 
to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended 
to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been 
interpreted as stating actual fact about the public figure involved. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). 
251 See Gilles, supra note 149, at 77. 
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when speech that otherwise satisfied all the elements of the tort criticized a 
political figure.252 Nor is it sufficient to write Hustler off as a special case, 
involving a parody that no one could have taken as fact. The Court's opinion 
leaves no doubt that, had the cartoon incorporated believable elements, an 
actual malice analysis would have been required.253 
The operative reason for denying some degree of constitutional scrutiny in 
Cohen is revealed in Justice White's argument that the Minnesota newspapers 
may not have "obtained Cohen's name 'lawfully' in this case, at least for 
purposes of publishing it. "254 Although the breach of promise technically 
occurred upon publication, Justice White saw the violation of law as a part of 
the newsgathering process.255 
Exactly what consequences flow from unlawful newsgathering remain 
unclear. At the very least, Justice White must have meant that publication of 
information obtained unlawfully is not entitled to full First Amendment 
protection; otherwise, he would not have distinguished Florida Star v. B.F.J.256 
in the very next sentence. 257 Because the newsgatherer is already liable for any 
crime or tort committed before publication, then, to give meaning to Justice 
White's dictum, the violation must also render the publisher liable for criminal 
or tortious publication without the First Amendment scrutiny that might 
otherwise be required when the law is applied to the press. From there, it is but 
a very short step to holding that, where circumstances permit, a court may 
enjoin publication of illegally obtained information. Even if it was not Justice 
White's intention to make that leap, even if his sensitivity to prior restraint had 
not softened in the twenty years between the Pentagon Papers case and Cohen, 
his opinion has undeniably emboldened other courts to restrain illegally 
obtained information. 258 
252 See id. at 76-77. 
253 "This is not merely a 'blind application' of the New York Times [Co. v. Sullivan] 
standard," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority in Hustler, "it reflects our 
considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate 'breathing space' to 
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. 
254 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991). 
255 Seeid. 
256 491 u.s. 524 (1989). 
257 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671. 
258 See infra notes 346-68 and accompanying text. 
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B. Unlmiful Newsgathering 
1. The Constitutional Privacy Cases 
In deciding that Cohen was controlled by the line of cases enforcing "laws 
of general applicability" against the media, Justice White summarily dismissed 
the newspapers' assertion that the case should be controlled by the line of 
constitutional privacy cases that culminates in the proposition that "'if a 
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public 
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of 
the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest 
order.' "259 In so doing, however, he misstated the holdings of those cases and 
then adopted them: "As the cases relied upon by ... [the newspapers] 
recognize, the truthful information sought to be published must have been 
lawfully acquired. "260 Those cases say nothing of the sort. However, Justice 
White's misstatement has been embraced by lower courtjudges.261 
The origin of the doctrine is usually ascribed to Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn, 262 which held that a state law criminalizing the publication of a rape 
victim's name could not be the basis for a civil action against a television station 
that obtained the name from official court records available to the public. 263 
Writing for the majority, Justice White merely observed that Cohn "has not 
contended that the name was obtained in an improper fashion, "264 without any 
discussion of how that might have altered the outcome. 265 In Oklahoma 
Publishing Co. v. District Court,266 the Court again merely observed the 
259 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668-69 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 
103 (1979)). 
260 /d. at 669. 
261 See, e.g., Scheetz v. Morning Call Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 213 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(Mansmann, J., dissenting). Judge Mansmann explained: 
I concur with the district court's determination that the [F]irst [A]mendment values [of 
infonnation regarding spousal abuse by a police officer] outweigh the Scheetzes' privacy 
interest, but I would vacate the order of the district court and remand for trial, 
nevertheless, because if proven, the fact that The Call knowingly acquired the 
information in an unlawful manner should permit the plaintiffs to recover. 
/d. at207 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
262 420 u.s. 469 (1975). 
263 See id. at 496-97. 
264 /d. at 496. 
265 See id. at 496-97. 
266 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam). 
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absence of "evidence that [the publisher] acquired the information 
unlawfully"267 as it unanimously struck down a pretrial order enjoining the 
publication of the name or photograph of a juvenile defendant acquired by the 
news media in open court proceedings. 268 In Landmark Communications, Inc. 
v. Virginia,269 an opinion striking down criminal sanctions against a newspaper 
that published an accurate report of the confidential proceedings of a state 
judicial inquiry commission, Chief Justice Burger refined the issue before the 
Court by noting, "We are not here concerned with the possible applicability of 
the statute to one who secures the information by illegal means and thereafter 
divulges it. "270 Nothing more was said on the subject, but the holdings of all 
three of these cases were subsequently characterized in Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publishing Co. as "suggest[ing] strongly" the principle quoted above as later 
relied on by the newspaper in Cohen. 271 In Smith, the Court struck down a state 
law imposing criminal sanctions on a newspaper that published the name of a 
juvenile offender acquired by "asking various witnesses, the police, and an 
assistant prosecuting attorney" at the scene of the crime. 272 Again, Chief Justice 
Burger made the point that the case did not involve any unlawful conduct by the 
news media,273 but offered no dicta on the subject. 
A decade later, the Court had occasion to revisit the issue in Florida Star v. 
B.J.F. ,274 in which it reversed the imposition of civil damages against a 
newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim that appeared in a report 
that police inadvertently placed in its press room. 275 In a footnote to the 
majority opinion, Justice Marshall wrote: 
The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue of whether, in cases where 
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, 
267 !d. at 311. 
268 See id. at 311-12. 
269 435 u.s. 829 (1978). 
270 /d. at 837. While there was nothing in the record to indicate how I andmark acquired 
the information, it is quite clear that the information came from a participant in the 
proceedings. See I andmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 233 S.E.2d 120, 123 n.4 (Va. 
1977). I andmark specifically argued that the "information concerning the judge in question 
'lost its confidentiality' and 'became public upon its first disclosure' by a participant in the 
proceedings, and all Landmark did was to publish information 'which was voluntarily and 
freely given to it.'" /d. at 123 (emphasis omitted). 
271 Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). 
272 !d. at 99. The Smith Court characterized as lawful the newspaper's "routine 
newspaper reporting techniques." !d. at 103. 
273 See id. at 103-05. 
274 491 u.s. 524 (1989). 
275 See id. at 527-29. 
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government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing 
publication as well. This issue was raised but not definitively resolved inNew 
York Times Co. v. United States, and reserved in Landmark Communications. 
We have no occasion to address it here.276 
Such was the true state of the law when, in Cohen, Justice White wrote that 
the issue had been settled by these very cases and that First Amendment 
protection extended only to information that had been lawfully obtained.277 
The pre-Cohen Court was justifiably hesitant to settle this issue in the 
context of the privacy cases. First, no case worthy of review squarely presented 
the issue of a newsgatherer behaving unlawfully. Apart from violating the very 
statute or common law proscription whose constitutionality was at issue, none 
of the reporters in these cases committed any unlawful acts. fudeed, because so 
few cases involve a newsgatherer blatantly behaving unlawfully, a "good" case 
may never reach the Supreme Court. A more fundamental reason for treading 
carefully in this area is that such a rule trenches on the First Amendment rights 
of the general public no less than it trenches on the rights of the publisher or 
broadcaster. 
2. The Right to Receive Information 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that the First Amendment right 
of free speech and press includes the public's right to receive information as 
well as the publisher's or broadcaster's right to disseminate it. Sometimes those 
rights have conflicted, and the question was which should triumph;278 at other 
times, the rights have coincided and reinforced each other.279 Cohen was a case 
276 Id. at 535 n.8 (citations omitted). 
277 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) ("As the cases relied on 
by respondents recognize, the truthful information sought to be published must have been 
lawfully acquired."). 
278 See, e.g., Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding the First 
Amendment right of editors to select what should be printed in a newspaper superior to a 
statutory public right of reply to what was printed); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 389-90 (1969) (holding the First Amendment right of the viewers and listeners superior 
to the right of the broadcasters in justifying content regulation of broadcasting). 
279 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980) 
(finding a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials in the public's "freedom to 
listen," which is inherent in and gives meaning to freedom of speech and of the press); First 
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-86 (1978) (striking down a state law limiting the 
political speech of corporations based on the inherent value of political speech independent of 
the speaker's identity); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-70 (1976) (striking down a restriction on price advertising as 
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of the latter type, although the Supreme Court failed utterly to consider that 
aspect of the case. Notwithstanding thoughtful academic protestations to the 
contrary,280 the Court has embraced the notion that the public's "right to 
know" is a serious First Amendment interest, a bona fide nexus between 
newsgathering and constitutional protection. A corollary of that principle is that 
the Constitution protects the speech itself, no less than the speaker;281 and to the 
extent that protection attaches to speech, that speech may not be suppressed 
absent an overriding governmental interest. 
That the Constitution protects the right of the public to receive information 
is fundamental to mainstream theories of the First Amendment. 282 The 
"marketplace of ideas" contains "buyers" as well as "sellers." Ironically, one 
of the most articulate expressions of this aspect of the First Amendment right 
comes from Justice White's opinion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.283 
Upholding the Federal Communications Commission's "Fairness Doctrine," 
which was a series of regulations that required broadcasters to carry diverse 
views on controversial issues, including a "right of reply" to personal attacks, 
violating the First Amendment rights of speaker and recipient alike). 
280 Lucas Powe writes, "[A]part from Justice Douglas, and with the exception of some 
overblown dicta from other justices, the Court never saw the right-to-lmow model as a viable 
First Amendment doctrine." PoWE, supra note 31, at 259. While the importance of Powe's 
misgivings about the slippery slope toward government regulation of the press that the right-
to-lmow model suggests should not be underestimated, particularly in light of outright 
advocacy by such influential scholars as Owen Fiss, see, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF 
FREE SPEECH 17-18, 22-25, 57 (1996), Powe both overstates the danger and understates the 
extent to which right-to-Imow has been absorbed into the constitutional jurisprudence. There 
is a need to recognize and accept, as the Court has, a strong right-to-Imow thread in a tapestry 
of First Amendment theory that values the speaker's autonomy above all. In that regard, 
Bollinger's ambivalence is more appropriate than either Powe's libertarianism or Fiss's 
communitarianism, although the dual system he recommends (unregulated print media, 
regulated electronic media) is increasingly unsatisfactory as new media emerge to obscure the 
bright lines. See BolliNGER, supra note 67, at 117. 
281 See Virginia State Ed. of Phannacy, 425 U.S. at 756 (Where a willing speaker 
exists, "the protection afforded [by the First Amendment] is to the communication, to its 
source and to its recipients both."). 
282 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 25, at 882 ("Through the acquisition of new 
lmowledge, the toleration of new ideas, the testing of opinion in open competition, the 
discipline of rethinking its assumptions, a society will be better able to reach common 
decisions that will meet the needs and aspirations of its members."); Meiklejohn, supra note 
28, at 255 ("Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, 
integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a 
ballot is assumed to express."). Excerpts from both articles appear in FIRsr AMENDMENT 
ANTHOLOGY 2, 8 (Donald E. Lively et al. eds., 1994). 
283 395 u.s. 367 (1969). 
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Justice White declared: 
The people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their 
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and 
purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . . It is the right of the 
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other 
ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not be abridged 
either by Congress or by the FCC.284 
That is not to say that, in any contest between the rights of the public and 
the rights of the speaker, the rights of the public will always prevail. When a 
similar "right of reply" question involving newspapers, rather than broadcast 
stations, arose in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo285 half a decade 
later, Justice White joined a unanimous Court in reversing the balance.286 The 
right of the people to a diversity of views was not denied in the Tornillo case, 
but merely subordinated to the superior First Amendment rights accorded to 
print, but not broadcast, media.287 
In other cases, the right of the public to receive information works in 
concert with the right of speakers to provide it. One such case was Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Cowzcil, Inc.288 With 
only the Chief Justice dissenting, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting 
licensed pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs. 289 
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun pointed out that precedent going back 
to the 1940s held that the freedom of speech necessarily protects the right to 
receive information and ideas.290 "If there is a right to advertise," Justice 
Blackmun wrote, "there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising. »291 
284 ld. at 390. 
285 418 u.s. 241 (1974). 
286 See id. at 259-63 {White, J., concurring). 
287 Owen Fiss laments that Red lion has become an "empty" precedent, especially in 
light of Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (remanding legislation 
regulating cable television's carriage of broadcast signals), which treated Red lion as a 
"formal vestige of another era." Flss, supra note 280, at 69, 72. Like Powe on the opposite 
side of this issue, Fiss cannot seem to separate the idea of a public right to know from its 
dominant or subordinate position vis-a-vis the speaker's right to speak in a given case. See id. 
at 17-18, 22-25, 57; PoWE, supra note 31, at 235-59. 
288 425 u.s. 748 (1976). 
289 See id. at 773. 
290 See id. at 757 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) and other 
cases). 
291 ld. 
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Most significantly for this discussion, Justice Blackmun expressly stated the 
necessary corollary of the "right to receive" -namely that the First Amendment 
right attaches to the communication itself, no less than to the speaker or the 
audience. 292 
That notion was ratified in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, in 
which the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that limited the political 
speech of corporations to matters directly affecting their businesses. 293 Justice 
Powell wrote: "The inherent worth of the speech in tenns of its capacity for 
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual. "294 When that speech is 
constitutionally protected, he added, "the legislature is constitutionally 
disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the 
speakers who may address a public issue. "295 
Finally, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court reaffirmed 
that "[fjree speech carries with it some freedom to listen."296 Finding few, if 
any, aspects of government "of higher concern and importance to the people" 
than the way criminal trials are conducted, the Court declared that "the First 
Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit 
government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been 
open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. "297 
The inescapable lesson to be drawn from these holdings is that First 
Amendment protection attaches to the speech itself, as well as to the speaker 
and the audience. Thus, the speaker is irrelevant to the First Amendment value 
of the speech. In the context of news or information that is unlawfully acquired, 
these precedents would dictate that the means of acquisition is similarly 
irrelevant to the value of the speech. 
C. Application to Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 
There is no need to debunk the Cohen dicta regarding laws of general 
applicability or unlawfully acquired information in order to conclude that Cohen 
itself was wrongly decided.298 Although the promise occurred during 
292 See id. at 756. 
293 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-86 (1978). 
294 !d. at 777. 
295 !d. at 784-85. 
296 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980). 
297 !d. at575-76. 
298 This opinion, of course, is not universally held. Jerome Barron, for example, argues 
that Cohen could actually improve the untrammeled flow of news and perhaps provide greater 
protection for the press in the long run. See Jerome A. Barron, Cohen v. Cowles Media and 
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newsgathering, the breach depended upon publication. The injury arose from 
publication, not newsgathering, and the damages, although characterized as 
nonreputational, were precisely that. Dan Cohen did not lose his job because he 
was promised confidentiality, or even because the promise was broken, but 
rather because the story exposed his lack of character.299 Under those 
circumstances, Minnesota's law of promissory estoppel was no more a law of 
general applicability than libel, invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell should have controlled the 
outcome just as Justice Blackmun insisted. 300 
But even if promissory estoppel could properly be characterized as a law of 
general applicability, the precedents discussed above show conclusively that 
whatever harms may occur from a violation must be balanced against any First 
Amendment interests at stake. On the merits, the First Amendment value of the 
revelation in Cohen was of highest order-truthful information about dirty 
tricks in political campaigns-and was vital to an informed electorate.301 Any 
Its Significance for First Amendment Law and Journalism, 3 WM. & MARY BIIL OF RTS. J. 
419, 419 (1994). Of all of the analyses published in the years immediately following Cohen, 
the article that most closely parallels this Article is Gregory F. Monday, Note, Cohen v. 
Cowles Media/s Not a Promising Decision, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1243. 
299 One might compare this with Judge Tilley's refusal to allow Food Lion to recover 
for loss of business or drop in stock price unless it was willing to raise a legal claim against 
ABC's broadcast, rather than merely its newsgathering practices. See infra note 415 and 
accompanying text. 
300 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 674-75 (1991) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
301 In another case involving political campaigns, the Court pointed out that there is little 
doubt that "public discussion of the qualifications of a candidate for elective office presents 
what is probably the strongest possible case for application of the New York Times [Co. v. 
Sullivan] rule" and the strongest possible case for independent review. Ocala Star-Banner Co. 
v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300 (1971). As Madison observed in 1800, just nine years after 
ratification of the First Amendment: 
Let it be recollected, lastly, that the right of electing the members of the government 
constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and responsible government. The 
value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and 
demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of 
examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively. 
Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (House of Delegates Session of 1799-1800), in 
4 THE DEBATES IN TilE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON TilE ADoPTION OF TilE FEDERAL 
CONsrmJTION AS REcOMMENDED BY TilE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADElPHIA, IN 
1787, at 575 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 1861). The Court has also pointed out that "[t]his value 
must be protected with special vigilance. . . . Vigorous reportage of political campaigns is 
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injury on the other side of the scale was the result of Dan Cohen's decision to 
reveal unsavory trivia about a political opponent. Only the notion that speech 
loses its First Amendment value if unlawfully acquired could tip the balance the 
other way. 
Even if that were good law, the information in Cohen was not unlawfully 
acquired. Cohen's identity as the source of the unsavory information was freely 
given to the reporters, who, in tum, had every intention of keeping their 
promise of confidentiality. There was no fraud or misrepresentation in the 
acquisition. If there was a breach-indeed, one might argue that Cohen 
misrepresented his information, which was both irrelevant to the campaign and 
publicly available-it occurred upon publication. Justice White's musings about 
unlawfully acquired information were merely dicta. 
But even if the information were unlawfully acquired, the Court's own 
precedents hold that First Amendment protection attaches to the speech, 
independent of the speaker, for the benefit of the audience, and countervailing 
policy arguments are inadequate to overcome that protection. The public 
deserved to know what Dan Cohen did, and the papers should not have been 
held liable for publishing the information. Journalistic ethics aside, 302 the First 
necessary for the optimal functioning of democratic institutions and central to our history of 
individual liberty." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 687 
(1989). 
302 Cohen, of course, bas become a case study in journalistic ethics as well as First 
Amendment law. Much was made by the Minnesota Supreme Court of the ethical component 
in deciding that Cohen's case was justified on public policy grounds: 
What is significant in this case is that the record shows the defendant newspapers 
themselves believed that they generally must keep promises of confidentiality given a 
news source. The reporters who actually gave the promises adamantly testified that their 
promises should have been honored. The editors who countermanded the promises 
conceded that never before or since have they reneged on a promise of confidentiality. A 
former Minneapolis Star managing editor testified that the newspapers had "hung Mr. 
Cohen out to dry because they didn't regard him very highly as a source." The Pioneer 
Press Dispatch editor stated nothing like this had happened in her 27 years in journalism. 
The Star Tribune's editor testified that protection of sources was "extremely important." 
Other experts, too, stressed the ethical importance, except on rare occasions, of keeping 
promises of confidentiality. It was this long-standing journalistic tradition that Cohen, 
who has worked in journalism, relied upon in asking for and receiving a promise of 
anonymity. 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391-92 (Minn. 1992). After Cohen, the issue 
was treated \vith more ambivalence in one leading journalism ethics text: 
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Amendment should have precluded any judgment for Cohen. It did not, of 
course, and the fallout from Cohen is already apparent at the trial level and 
even among appellate judges. 
IV. THE COHENMALEDICTA IN COURT 
The mischief done by the Cohen "maledicta" is readily apparent in any 
review of the post-Cohen newsgathering cases that have come before state and 
federal courts. This survey looks first at a series of broken-promise cases that 
show the impact of the Cohen opinion on lower courts considering similar, but 
factually and legally distinguishable, issues. Then it will tum to some very 
different post-Cohen cases to illustrate how the Cohen dicta regarding 
unlawfully acquired information and generally applicable laws have been used 
(or misused) in an effort to punish news gathering practices. 
A. The Broken-Promise Cases 
Among the earliest victims of the Cohen decision, of course, were the 
defendants in the Cohen case itself. On remand, the Supreme Court of 
The ethical conflict in this case is between two virtues: 1) the right of the source to 
expect a promise to be kept and 2) the feeling of the editors that the audience needed the 
infonnation about the source. Audiences' need for that infonnation should be so great 
that damage done by the breaking of a reporter's (and hence, the newspaper's) promise 
is acceptable. 
The key ethical question may lie in the editors' motives. If their intent was to 
inform readers about a campaign tactic they considered questionable, justification comes 
fairly easily. If, however, editors were even subconsciously trying to embarrass a 
candidate by trying to expose the candidate's agent, ethical justification becomes 
prohibitively difficult. Generally, any good that may come from embarrassing the 
candidate will be more than offset by damage to the newspaper's reputation among 
sources, and probably among readers. Violations of promises have a heavy burden to 
produce some greater good. In this case, that "good" would be a fully informed 
readership presumably better able to make a voting decision. 
As in other ethics issues, editors are obliged to search their own minds for motives. 
In their social role, editors can most easily defend an action that places audience interest 
first, and can be justified to the audience. Editors should acknowledge to their readers or 
listeners that publication of the source's name was not a matter taken lightly, recognizing 
that future coverage may be at risk because other sources will be reluctant to confide in 
reporters. 
JAY BLACK ET AL., DoiNG Ennes IN JOURNAllSM: A HANDBOOK wrrn CASE STUDIES 191 
(1993). 
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Minnesota accepted the proposition that "the doctrine [of promissory estoppel] 
is one of general application ... and its employment to enforce confidentiality 
promises has only 'incidental effects' on news gathering and reporting, so that 
the First Amendment is not offended. "303 The court went on to reject the 
defendants' procedural and public policy arguments, and declined to read the 
state's own constitutional press clause more expansively than the First 
Amendment. 304 Instead, it applied a pure promissory estoppel analysis to the 
facts of the case305 and came to this remarkable conclusion: 
Neither side in this case clearly holds the higher moral ground, but in view of 
the defendants' concurrence in the importance of honoring promises of 
confidentiality, and absent the showing of any compelling need in this case to 
break that promise, we conclude that the resultant harm to Cohen requires a 
remedy here to avoid an injustice. In short, defendants are liable in damages to 
plaintiff for their broken promise. 306 
It may have been the first time any court has required a newspaper to show a 
"compelling need" to publish in order to avoid damages. 
The Cohen defendants were not, however, the first to suffer from the 
decision; that honor appears to belong to Conde Nast Publications. The Eighth 
Circuit seized upon the Cohen opinion while the ink was still drying to reverse 
a summary judgment for Conde Nast in another Minnesota confidentiality case. 
In Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc.,301 the plaintiff, Jill Ruzicka, a 
sexual abuse victim, agreed to be interviewed for a story on sexual abuse by 
therapists in Glanwur Magazine. Co-defendant Claudia Dreifus, who wrote the 
story, promised Ruzicka that her name would not be used and that she would 
not be identifiable from the article. When the article was published, Ruzicka 
claimed that the steps taken to mask her identity were inadequate, although she 
named only two former therapists as having identified her, and filed suit in 
federal district court for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unjust 
enrichment. 308 The court granted summary judgment on all counts, finding the 
agreement too vague to constitute a waiver of the magazine's First Amendment 
rights309 and balancing the relevant interests in favor of the press.3IO "[A]t a 
303 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 389-90 (Minn. 1992). 
304 See id. at 390-91. 
305 See id. at 391. 
306 !d. at 392. 
307 733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn. 1990), rev'd, 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991). 
308 See Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1292. 
309 See id. at 1298. 
310 See id. at 1300-01 ("The Court has no doubt that in balancing the rights of the free 
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minimum," the court said, "the Constitution requires plaintiffs in contract 
actions to enforce a reporter-source agreement to prove specific, unambiguous 
terms and to provide clear and convincing proof that the agreement was 
breached," neither of which was present here. 311 
By the time the case reached the Eighth Circuit on appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court had already rejected the First Amendment ground upon which 
the Minnesota Supreme Court had denied Cohen recovery under a promissory 
estoppel theory.312 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit panel summarily dismissed 
the district court's constitutional analysis.313 It affirmed that court's dismissal of 
the breach of contract and state tort actions, but remanded the case to the 
district court to consider the promissory estoppel theory.314 The district court, 
on remand, found neither the promise nor the breach to be clear and 
unambiguous, even absent the heightened burden that a First Amendment 
analysis would impose. 315 On appeal once again, the Eighth Circuit vacated the 
judgment and sent the case back for trial, finding the promise sufficiently 
definite for a jury to determine its scope and adopting the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's standard of a "compelling need" to break the promise.316 The parties 
settled in early 1995.317 
Perhaps no broken-promise case more clearly demonstrates the impact of 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. than the New York case of Anderson v. Strong 
Memorial Hospital. 318 In that case, plaintiff Anderson was a patient in the 
defendant Strong Memorial Hospital, being treated by defendant Valenti, a 
physician specializing in AIDS research. Seeking Anderson's consent to be 
photographed for a story on Valenti's work, a Gannett reporter promised that 
Anderson would not be recognizable. When the photograph was published, 
however, Anderson was recognized by friends and family.319 
press with common contractual rights, the free press rights under the [F]irst [A]mendment 
must be given preference."). 
311 !d. at 1300. 
312 The district court in Ruzicka was well aware of the Cohen case, which had just been 
argued in the state supreme court, but declined to adopt the federal constitutional analysis of 
the state's intermediate appellate court, which had found the defendants liable for breach of 
contract. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d248, 256-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
313 See Ruzicka, 939 F.2d at 582 n.5. 
314 See id. at 583. 
315 See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 303, 309, 311 (D. 
Minn. 1992). 
316 See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 999 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1993). 
317 See Barbara W. Ball & John P. Borger, Broken Promises in the Aftermath of Cohen, 
COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER, Spring 1995, at 18. 
318 573 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). 
319 See id. at 829-30. 
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Anderson's lawsuit against Gannett for libel and invasion of privacy was 
dismissed, but his estate was awarded damages of $35,000 from Strong 
Memorial Hospital and Valenti for their breach of the confidential patient-
physician privilege. They, in turn, claimed contribution from Gannett based on 
its alleged negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and 
causing the breach of the patient-physician privilege. 320 
Denying Gannett's motion to dismiss the contribution action, the court 
found that Cohen effectively disposed of any federal constitutional question and 
declined to read New York's more expansive constitutional protection to 
encompass the disclosure of the identity of HIV-AIDS patients.321 Rather, the 
court cited Cohen for the proposition that "an unkept promise to a news source 
makes the press' conduct unlawful"322 and that "[c]ompelling the press to 
respect a promise made and relied upon ... does no more than compel the 
press to act as any other responsible citizen with respect to laws of general 
application. "323 
In embracing the entire Cohen rationale, the Anderson court declined to 
follow a pre-Cohen appellate division precedent that applied defamation-like 
protections to dismiss a broken-promise claim couched as negligence. In Virelli 
v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd., 324 plaintiffs had alleged that they were 
identifiable in an article on drug abuse published by the defendant, despite their 
conditioning their consent to be interviewed on the reporter's promise not to 
disclose their identities. 325 Finding the damages sought indistinguishable from 
injury to reputation and emotional distress, the court held that ordinary 
negligence was a constirutionally insufficient basis upon which to impose 
liability. 326 
Consistent with the broader applicability of the procedural protections to media 
defendants already discussed, but first applied in the context of defamation 
actions, these protections have been expressly extended by the United States 
Supreme Court to actions under the New York right of privacy statute, to 
actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and to both criminal 
prosecutions and civil damage actions arising out of media violations of state 
confidentiality laws. Various courts have likewise extended freedom of speech 
and press guarantees to media defendants in common-law invasion of privacy 
cases. We see no reason why these principles should not equally apply where, 
320 Seeid. 
321 See id. at 832. 
322 ld. 
323 ld. 
324 536 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
325 See id. at 571. 
326 See id. at 575. 
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as here, the only aspect of plaintiffs' claim distinguishing it from defamation 
and invasion of privacy is the alleged breach of ... [the reporter's] promise to 
self-censor the content of the articles so that plaintiffs' identities would remain 
confidential. 327 
The Anderson court was free to ignore the Virelli precedent because of an 
apparent split within the appellate division. Six months after the Virelli decision, 
another department of the appellate division affirmed the denial of summary 
judgment in actions for breach of contract and negligent infliction of emotional 
harm, where plaintiff rape victims were recognized in a broadcast interview 
which they agreed to on condition that their identities would be masked. 328 
Neither that court, nor the New York Court of Appeals, which dismissed the 
appeal without opinion, commented on either of those counts. 329 
It cannot be said that Cohen thwarted an inexorable trend in the lower 
courts toward imposing defamation-like burdens on plaintiffs who sought 
defamation-like damages for reporters' broken promises. 330 Nor did Cohen 
prevent subsequent courts from finding common law reasons for dismissing 
broken-promise claims. 331 What Cohen did was short-circuit the logical 
evolution of constitutional doctrine as exemplified by the trial courts in Ruzicka 
and Virelli. 
327 Id. at 576 (citations omitted). 
328 Doe v. American Broad. Cos., 543 N.Y.S.2d455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
329 Doe v. American Broad. Cos., 549 N.E.2d480 (N.Y. 1989). 
330 There were pre-Cohen cases that found no First Amendment protection for broken 
promises. See, e.g., Huskey v. NBC, 632 F.2d 1282 (N.D. ill. 1986) (holding that 
allegations that the network filmed the plaintiff prisoner in an "exercise cage," despite 
plaintiff's objections, were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss plaintiff's third-party 
beneficiazy claim for the network's breach of an agreement with the warden not to violate 
prisoners' privacy). And there were post-Cohen decisions that refused to award defamation-
like damages for newsgathering torts. See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
887 F. Supp. 811, 822 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (barring recovery of "publication damages for 
injury to its reputation," while allowing recovery of damages for newsgathering torts); see 
also Media liability, supra note 12. 
331 See, e.g., Doe v. KTNV-Channel13, 863 F. Supp. 1259 (D. Nev. 1994) (holding 
television station that mistakenly aired a program that revealed the identities of undercover 
policemen was not liable for breach of contract between the policemen and producers of the 
program, who were not affiliated with the station); Wildman v. Benvick Universal Pictures, 
803 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Miss.) (construing an ambiguous contract, restricting use of a 
filmed interview, against the plaintiff who drafted the contract), qff'd, 979 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 
1992); Sirany v. Cowles Media Co., 20 MediaL. Rep. (BNA) 1759 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1992) 
(holding newspaper's broken promise not to print an obituary of plaintiff's husband not 
actionable for lack of either consideration or detrimental reliance). 
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B. Unlawfully Acquired Information 
Today, Cohen's influence appears in a wide variety of newsgathering 
cases. One of the earliest attempts to apply the Cohen dictum regarding 
unlawfully acquired information appears in a dissenting opinion in Scheetz v. 
Morning Call, /nc.332 In that case, the defendant newspaper published a story 
on spousal abuse committed by Kenneth Scheetz, a highly decorated police 
officer. The story was based on a confidential police report, and there were 
unresolved allegations that the report had been stolen. 333 
The Scheetzes, husband and wife, filed a civil rights action alleging that the 
newspaper reporter had conspired with an unla10wn state actor to deprive them 
of their constitutional right to privacy in violation of forty-two United States 
Code section 1983. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment as to the section 1983 claim, holding that the First Amendment rights 
of the defendants outweighed the Scheetzes' privacy interest. 334 On appeal, the 
court of appeals concluded that the Scheetzes had no constitutionally protected 
privacy interest in the police report, and so it had no occasion to address the 
First Amendment balance struck by the district court. 335 
Writing in dissent, Judge Mansmann said he would have found a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest but, in light of Cohen, would have 
remanded to determine whether the information had been unlawfully 
acquired.336 "[I]fproven," Mansmann said, "the fact that [The Call] knowingly 
acquired the information in an unlawful manner should permit the plaintiffs to 
332 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991). 
333 The court handled the uncertainty as follows: 
There is some dispute as to how [reporter] Mutchler obtained a copy of the report. 
Mutchler submitted an affidavit in which she stated that she spoke to various confidential 
sources to see if any of them had a copy of the report. Mutchler averred that she did not 
conspire with or encourage anyone to steal the report. A source then showed her a copy 
of the report, and she copied information from it .... The plaintiffs cannot counter this 
affidavit, primarily because Mutchler's source remains confidential. [Police] Chief 
Stephens stated at his deposition that he told Mutchler that the report was stolen, but he 
also stated that he did not suspect that Mutchler had stolen it. Because we decide this 
appeal on other grounds, we need not resolve this dispute over how the report was 
obtained. 
!d. at 204 n.2. 
334 See id. at 205. 
335 See id. 
336 See id. at 213 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
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recover. "337 
Mansmann conceded that the public interest in the Scheetz case was 
"arguably even stronger" than found in the Supreme Court's constitutional 
privacy cases, 338 and that the Supreme Court had expressly reserved the 
question of First Amendment protection for the fruits of unl&wful 
newsgathering in those cases. 339 Incredibly, Mansmann then cited the recently 
decided Cohen for "hinting" that, despite the express reservation in Florida 
Star v. B.J.F.,340 the privacy "line of cases required that 'the truthful 
information sought to be published must have been lawfully acquired. "'341 
After quoting extensively from Cohen, Mansmann found the acquisition of 
information in Sheetz "at least one degree closer to being unlawful, because if 
proven, [The Call] and its reporter would have known that the confidential 
report had been unlawfully acquired. "342 Thus, "even affording great weight to 
First Amendment values," Mansmann would have denied The Call "the 
benefits of its, or its agents', wrongdoing. "343 Bolstering his argument with 
misguided public policy considerations, 344 Mansmann concluded that "where 
confidential information, protected by the constitutional guarantee of privacy, is 
unlawfully acquired, I would hold that the [F]irst [A]mendment does not afford 
the press a defense against civil liability. "345 
The Scheetz dissent, and the same Cohen dictum, found its way into the 
decision of a California appellate court that affirmed the right of a judge to 
confiscate the film of a newspaper photographer who took photographs of a 
criminal defendant's arraignment without the authorization required by the 
337 /d. at207 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
338 /d. at 212 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
339 See id. at 212-13 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
340 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989). 
341 Scheetz, 946 F.2d at 213 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991)). 
342 /d. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
343 /d. (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
344 Mansmann explained his public policy considerations as follows: 
Drawing this bright line at unlawful acquisition eliminates the need to establish criminal 
liability in each case. This rule would also serve, in the absence of internal discipline by 
the press, to enhance the public interest in accurate, verified reporting as well as 
encouraging lawful acquisition of information .... [It] also draws a bright line 
eliminating the need for ad hoc editorial decision-making that triggers the specter of self-
censorship antithetical to [F]irst [A]mendment values. 
/d. at 214 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
345 /d. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
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California Rules of Court. 346 Finding a "clear violation" of the rule, the trial 
judge denied the newspaper's motion for return of the film "'in the interest of 
preserving order and control and respect in the court proceedings. "'347 On 
petition for a writ to release the film, the court of appeals found that, since 
courtroom photography could be completely banned by a trial court, 
confiscation of photographs that were not allowed does not constitute a prior 
restraint. 348 
Had the court stopped there, it would have been on solid ground; the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the right of courts to bar photography 
and, presumably, enforce that prohibition. 349 But the court chose instead to 
assume, arguendo, that the seizure was a prior restraint, and then invoked 
Cohen and the Sheetz dissent to justify confiscation. 350 The court of appeals 
wrote: 
As stated by our high court in [Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.], "[1]he truthful 
information sought to be published must have been lawfully acquired. The 
press may not with impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather 
news." Based on the foregoing, we conclude that photographs or electronic 
recordings obtained in violation of the law pertaining to the power of the trial 
court to limit or prevent courtroom media coverage under rule 980, may be 
subject to restraint.35I 
The state court's gratuitous conclusion that unlawful newsgathering can 
justify a prior restraint required it to reject the then-leading federal case on 
point, In re King World Productions, Inc.,352 which was reaffirmed post-Cohen 
in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trnst Co.353 In the latter case, the 
"unlawful newsgathering" issue was merely a digression in Procter & Gamble's 
high-stakes lawsuit against Bankers Trust for alleged fraud in the sale of 
derivative securities. The parties had induced a dying judge to sign a broad, 
stipulated protective order giving themselves discretionary authority to file 
346 See Marin Indep. Journal v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993). 
347 !d. at 552. 
348 See id. at 553. 
349 See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 581 n.39 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring) 
(approving proscriptions against still photography, as well as broadcasting). 
350 See Marin Indep. Journal, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554-55. 
351 !d. at 555. 
352 898 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990) (vacating as an unconstitutional prior restraint a 
temporary restraining order which enjoined the television broadcast of videotape which, 
according to the plaintiff, was obtained in violation of federal and state law). 
353 78 F.3d 219 {6th Cir. 1996). 
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discovery and other materials under seal. 354 When sealed documents supporting 
Procter & Gamble's RICO allegations against Bankers Trust came into the 
hands of McGraw-Hill Companies' Business Week magazine, the parties asked 
the new presiding judge to enjoin publication of any information contained in 
those documents. 355 
Three hours before Business Week was scheduled to go to press, District 
Judge John Feikens sent a facsimile to McGraw-Hill prohibiting publication 
pending further proceedings. 356 McGraw-Hill unsuccessfully sought relief from 
the district court,357 the Sixth Circuit,358 and the U.S. Supreme Court,359 and a 
second deadline passed before Judge Feikens held the first of two hearings on 
how McGraw-Hill acquired the documents.360 A third deadline passed before 
Judge Feikens, finding that McGraw-Hill had acquired the documents 
unlawfully, made the injunction permanent, even as it removed the documents 
from the protective order.361 In March of 1996, the Sixth Circuit reversed.362 
Although Cohen is not mentioned in any of the decisions arising from this 
case, its dictum is suggested in Justice Stevens's denial of McGraw-Hill's 
application to stay Judge Feikens's temporary restraining order,363 and 
354 See id. at 222. 
355 See id. The documents in question were provided to Business Week by an attorney at 
the firm that represented Bankers Trust. The attorney, who was not working on the case, had 
worked with Business Week's legal affairs editor on another case, and agreed to obtain a copy 
of the materials for her. Exactly when the attorney first learned the documents were under 
seal is unclear. See Keith H. Hammonds & Catherine Yang, Business Week vs. the Judge, 
Bus. WK., Oct. 16, 1995, at 114. 
356 See Procter & Gamble, 78 F .3d at 222. 
357 Actually, there is some dispute about whether the district court was asked to reverse 
its order. Business Week says its counsel turned to the Sixth Circuit "[a]fter failing to contact 
(District Judge John) Feikens," which suggests that he made the attempt. Feikens insisted that 
he "was always available to provide a full hearing." Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust 
Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 188 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
358 See Procter & Gamble, 78 F .3d at 229. 
359 See McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 116 S. Ct. 6 (1995) (mem.) 
(declining review on jurisdictional grounds). 
360 See Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 188. 
36l See id. at 192-93. 
362 See Procter & Gamble, 78 F.3d at 227. 
363 See McGraw-Hill, 116 S. Ct. at 6. Apart from its allowing the prior restraint to 
stand, Justice Stevens's opinion is most notable for his gratuitous comment on the magazine's 
newsgathering. Suggesting that the magazine had been disingenuous in protesting that it did 
not know the materials were under protective order, Justice Stevens indicated that "the 
manner in which petitioner came into possession of the information it seeks to publish may 
have a bearing on its right to do so." !d. at 7. Judge Feikens would quote that sentence in 
permanently enjoining McGraw-Hill from using the materials it had "obtained unlawfully." 
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fundamental to Judge Feikens's own opinion making the order permanent. 
Judge Feikens wrote: 
I conclude that Business Week was aware of the protective order before it 
obtained the sealed documents and that Business Week actively sought to obtain 
the sealed documents while it knew of the protective order .... Thus, I 
conclude that Business Week may not use the confidential materials that it 
obtained unlawfully.364 
To the extent that Judge Feikens relied on any authority, it was not Cohen, 
but Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,365 which dealt specifically with a party's 
disclosure of sealed discovery materials, and which the Sixth Circuit found 
utterly inapt. 366 The notion that unlawfully acquired information somehow loses 
its First Amendment protection had become so pervasive, however, that Judge 
Feikens probably thought no authority was necessary. 
The Sixth Circuit opinion makes clear that "how Business Week obtained 
the documents and whether or not its personnel had been aware that they were 
sealed" were not relevant to the magazine's right to publish the information 
without prior restraint. 367 But the censorship had continued for weeks in fact 
and for months as a matter of law. Moreover, even the Sixth Circuit opinion 
intimates that subsequent punishment may be appropriate for publishing 
illegally acquired information. 368 The issue of punishing news gathering 
practices without regard to publication arises more often in cases suggesting that 
no First Amendment inquiry is needed where the press violates laws of general 
applicability. 
C. Generally Applicable Torts 
Cohen's contribution to this area of law is not the unremarkable statement 
that the press, like anyone else, is subject to generally applicable criminal 
statutes and tort law. It is, rather, that the press, or anyone else for that matter, 
may be punished under such laws when engaging in protected activities like 
newsgathering without any First Amendment inquiry. As a consequence, the 
press is losing summary judgment motions that it ought to win, and common 
Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 188. 
364 Procter & Gamble, 900 F. Supp. at 191, 193. 
365 467 u.s. 20 (1984). 
366 See Procter & Gamble, 78 F.3d at 225. 
367 !d. 
368 How the documents were acquired, and whether the magazine !mew that they were 
sealed, "might be appropriate lines of inquiry for a contempt proceeding or a criminal 
prosecution," the court says. !d. 
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law tort claims are being sent to juries without any constitutional consideration. 
Risenhoover v. Englantf369 is the most striking example of this problem and 
also the most recent. In that case, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms ("ATF") and their relatives sued various media organizations 
covering the ill-fated raid of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, 
on February 28, 1993, for the deaths and injuries suffered by agents conducting 
the raid. The single allegation that survived the media defendants' motion for 
summary judgment was that, by their presence and conduct around the 
compound at the time of the raid, reporters and videographers may have tipped 
off the cult and thereby negligently interfered with the execution of the ATF 
arrest and search warrants.370 The court's rejection of defendants' claim that 
their activities were protected by the First Amendment was based squarely on 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.311 
Quoting extensively from Cohen, District Judge Walter Smith called 
Texas's law of negligence a "law of general applicability," in that "any burden 
placed on the press by its application 'is no more than incidental, and 
constitutionally insignificant.' "372 
Defendants are no more free to cause harm to others while gathering the news 
than any other individual. As Plaintiffs note, it would be ludicrous to assume 
that the First Amendment would protect a reporter who negligently ran over a 
pedestrian while speeding merely because the reporter was on the way to cover 
a news story _373 
Judge Smith then proceeded to recognize a negligence cause of action, even 
though neither the court nor either party could identify a single case in any 
jurisdiction that had held a journalist liable for negligent conduct while covering 
a law enforcement operation.374 Instead, the court relied on other cases in 
which police officers were injured through the negligence of non-journalists. 
Judge Smith found these cases to be "instructive in that the media Defendants, 
because they are not protected by the First Amendment, face the potential 
liability faced by any other individual in the same circumstances. "375 The sole 
Texas case on point involved a police officer's personal injury lawsuit against 
an abortion clinic protester whom he attempted to lift and remove from the 
369 936 F. Supp. 392 (W.D. Tex. 1996). 
370 See id. at 407. 
37l See id. at 404 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)). 
372 /d. (quoting Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672). 
373 !d. 
374 See id. at 405. 
375 !d. 
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scene of the protest. 376 Proceeding with a conventional tort law analysis, Judge 
Smith found both statute-based and common law duty, the latter by applying a 
"risk-utility balancing test. "377 To be sure, the "social utility of the defendant's 
conduct"378 was a factor to be considered in this balance, but not the social 
utility of newsgathering in general. Rather, the court said, "[t]he issue is 
whether the actions of the Defendants in failing to exercise some degree of 
caution to avoid warning the Davidians of the impending raid outweighs the 
risk that compromising the secrecy of the operation would result in death and 
injury to a number of law enforcement agents. "379 Despite the defendants' 
entreaty that the court "refrain from creating a rule that would hold the media 
liable for 'routine' newsgathering activities, "380 which the court dismissed with 
a perfunctory remark on the uniqueness of the event, 381 the case was allowed to 
go fonvard and was eventually settled. 382 
If the circumstances at the Branch Davidian compound were hardly routine, 
as the court said, the newsgathering practices in which the reporters and 
videographers were engaged would not nonnally raise an eyebrow. Similarly, 
when a reporter for Channel 12 in Narragansett, Rhode Island, conducted a 
consensual telephone interview with a man who first threatened, then 
committed suicide, she would not have expected to face trial for negligence in a 
wrongful death action. Yet that was precisely the result of a Rhode Island 
Supreme Court holding which reversed a trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. 383 Although the court took its constitutional rule on laws of general 
applicability from Branlburg, not Cohen, the result was the same: "[W]e 
believe that notwithstanding First Amendment constitutional protections, 
everyone, including the press, should be answerable for unprivileged negligent 
actions that proximately result in suicide. "384 In short, whatever protection 
routine newsgathering may have under the First Amendment, it appears to be 
insufficient even to protect the reporter from simple negligence, which is 
everywhere a law of general applicability. 
Another law of general applicability, tortious interference with performance 
376 See Airington v. Jubl, 883 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 
377 Risenhoover, 936 F. Supp. at407. 
378 !d. 
379 !d. at 408. 
380 !d. 
381 See id. 
382 See Cases Roise Concerns About Newsgathering Protections, [News Notes] 24 
MediaL. Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 17, 1996). 
383 See Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805 (R.I. 1996). 
384 !d. at 811. 
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of contract by a third person,385 was the driving force behind CBS's recent 
decision to spike a scheduled 60 Minutes interview with former Brown . & 
Williamson Tobacco Company executive Jeffrey Wigand. 386 In discussing his 
and his employer's knowledge of the addictiveness of nicotine and the dangers 
of smoking, Wigand would certainly have violated his own nondisclosure 
agreement with Brown & Williamson. Because CBS had paid Wigand some 
$12,000 as a consultant and, even more damning, agreed to indemnify Wigand 
in any future libel action, 387 network attorneys believed they were vulnerable to 
a tortious interference claim, notwithstanding the accuracy of the reporting or 
the fact that the tort had never before been successfully used in such 
circumstances. 
CBS was roundly criticized for capitulating to the inchoate threat of a 
lawsuit which would almost certainly fail under First Amendment scrutiny. 388 
But, as information concerning CBS's actual relationship with Wigand came to 
light, news media critics began to view the network's legal and ethical position 
as compromised, 389 and at least one legal commentator attributed the network's 
decision directly to Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 390 "[U]nder Cohen's 
reasoning," wrote William Bennett Turner, "subjecting the press to liability for 
tortiously inducing a breach of contract is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
First Amendment, even when the press publishes the truth. "391 
Turner and others have pointed out that common law elements of the tort 
may well have sufficed to protect CBS from liability on a tortious interference 
385 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979). Variations of the tort appear 
at § 766A, intentional interference with another's performance of his own contract with a 
third person; § 766B, intentional interference with prospective contractual relations not yet 
reduced to contract; and § 766C, negligent interference with either existing or prospective 
contractual relations. 
386 See Bill Carter, '60 Minutes' Ordered to Pull Interview in Tobacco Report, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1995, at Al. 
387 Martin London, a plaintiff's attorney well !mown for his campaigns against the 
media, has spelled out the logic of the indemnification this way: since Brown & Williamson is 
a public figure, they would have to show !mowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth in 
any libel suit against Wigand. Thus, CBS's offer of indemnification was tantamount to a 
license to lie. Audio tape of Association of American Law Schools 1996 Annual Meeting, 
Session on Surreptitious Newsgathering (Jan. 3-7, 1996) (on file with author). 
388 See, e.g., Self-Censorship at CBS, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1995, at D14. 
389 See, e.g., Jonathan Alter, Blowing Smoke at CBS, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 1995, at 45; 
Howard Kurtz, Details of Unaired Tobacco Story Emerge, WASH. Posr, Nov. 18, 1995, at 
A3. 
390 See William Bennett Turner, News Media liability for "Tortious Interference" with a 
Source's Nondisclosure Contract, COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER, Spring 1996, at 13-14. 
391 Id. 
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claim.392 As articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the interference 
must be "improper," requiring a balancing of the plaintiff's interest in 
contractual rights against the defendant's interest in freedom of action.393 "The 
issue is whether in the given circumstances [the defendant's] interest and the 
social interest in allowing the freedom claimed ... are sufficient to outweigh 
the harm that [the defendant's] conduct is designed to produce. "394 
The factors for determining whether interference is improper would seem 
to favor a media defendant pursuing a legitimate news story. 395 The 
Restatement itself gives examples directly analogous to the CBS case: 
In some cases the actor may be seeking to promote not solely an interest of his 
own but a public interest. The actor may believe that certain practices used in 
another's business are prejudicial to the public interest, as, for example, his 
maintenance of a gambling den . . . or his despoiling the environment. . . or 
his racial or sexual discrimination in his employment policy.396 
Short of immunity, it is difficult to imagine any First Amendment privilege 
that would be more protective in these circumstances. 397 Most recently, a New 
392 See id.; see also Sandra Baronet al., Tortious Interference: A Practical Primer for 
Media Practitioners, REP. LIBEL DEF. REsoURCE CENTER, January 1996. 
393 See REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. c (1979). 
!d. 
394 !d. (emphasis added). 
395 See id. at§ 767. 
396 Id. at § 767 cmt. f. In such cases, 
[i]f the actor causes a third person not to perfonn a contract ... in order to protect the 
public interest affected by these practices, relevant questions in detennining whether his 
interference is improper are: whether the practices are actually being used by the other, 
whether the actor actually believes that the practices are prejudicial to the public interest, 
whether his belief is reasonable, whether he is acting in good faith for the protection of 
the public interest, whether the contractual relation involved is incident or foreign to the 
continuance of the practices and whether the actor employs wrongful means to 
accomplish the result. 
397 Indeed, where the claim is asserted against the publisher or broadcaster, alleging that 
the substance of the publication or broadcast interfered with the plaintiff's prospective 
business relations with customers or clients, the few cases that have been brought, both before 
and after Cohen, suggest that the protection is sufficient. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Cmp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273-74 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that tortious 
interference based on the substance of a broadcast must be held to the standards of a 
defamation action); accord Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding 
that statements of opinion are protected from claims of defamation and tortious interference); 
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York court found that the tort could not be asserted against a talk show host 
who invited a guest onto his program knowing that she would violate a 
confidentiality provision in her divorce settlement. In Huggins v. Povich, the 
court held that "the broadcaster's [F]irst [A]mendment right to broadcast an 
issue of public importance, its lack of any motive in harming the plaintiff, and 
the obvious societal interest in encouraging freedom of the press, negate[d] 
essential elements of the tort. "398 
Even with such built-in protection, however, it is not certain that the 
journalist's conduct will always be evaluated with due regard to First 
Amendment considerations.399 Well before Cohen, a federal trial judge 
indicated that the subject of a magazine interview would be entitled to recover 
for tortious interference if the magazine induced the freelance writers to violate 
the terms under which they were granted the interview. 400 Additionally, the 
extraordinary intervention of the California Supreme Court was once required 
to reverse a lower court holding that a newsletter editorial calling upon its 
readers not to patronize businesses that advertised in the plaintiffs newspaper 
amounted to an intentional interference with economic relationship.401 
Moreover, "the cases fail to indicate clearly whether the judge or the jury 
makes the decision of whether the conduct was improper, "402 potentially 
subjecting media defendants to costly jury trials because summary judgment is 
not available. 
Most common law torts do not have the kind of built-in protection one finds 
Redco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 758 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that matters of public 
concern disclosed using true facts are not defamatory or intentionally interfering with 
business); Morningstar Inc. v. Los Angeles Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1994) (finding no intentional interference with economic advantage since commentary 
had no injurious falsehood); Dulgarian v. Stone, 652 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1995) (holding that 
unless statements are provable as false, they are not considered defamatory or tortiously 
interfering). But see Corporate Training Unlimited Inc. v. NBC, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 501, 512 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that tortious interference claim survives motion for summary 
judgment, even if merely a restatement of the defamation claim, where defamation claim is 
allowed to go forward). 
398 Huggins v. Povich, 24 MediaL. Rep. (BNA) 2040, 2047-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
399 A vigorous defender of the tort has nevertheless conceded that its built-in safeguards 
"may cede to free speech insufficient breathing space." David F. Partlett, From Vidorian 
Opera to Rock and Rap: Inducement to Breach of Contract in the Music Industry, 66 TuL. L. 
REv. 771, 810 (1992). 
400 See Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1209 (W.D. Va. 1981) 
(dictum). 
401 See Environmental Planning and Info. Council v. Detmold Publ'g Corp., 680 P.2d 
1086, 1092-93 (Cal. 1984). 
402 RFsrATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS § 767 cmt. 1 (1979). 
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in the tortious interference cause of action, and that was certainly true of the 
array of tort claims that Food Lion brought against ABC. Food Lion's many 
claims included "fraud, negligent supervision, trespass, respondeat superior 
liability, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud, unfair and deceptive 
trade practices, and civil conspiracy" -all of which withstood ABC's motions 
for dismissal403 and summary judgment. 404 In allowing those claims to go to the 
jury, United States District Judge N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., relied heavily on 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., although he made a far more sophisticated 
distinction between reputational and nonreputational damages than had the 
United States Supreme Court in Cohen. 405 
The Food Lion case began in late 1991 with a tip to Lynne Neufer Dale 
(then Lynne Litt), a producer for ABC's PrimeTime Live magazine-format 
news program, from someone representing the United Food & Commercial 
Workers International Union, that the Food Lion grocery store chain might 
present an appropriate subject for investigative reporting. Another ABC 
producer, Susan Barnett, received a similar tip from a union-affiliated 
organization. The union has publicly acknowledged that it aimed to unionize 
Food Lion or put it out of business. 406 In early 1992, Dale and Barnett 
submitted proposals for a PrimeTime Live story on Food Lion, which were 
subsequently approved by ABC management. The plan called for Dale and 
Barnett to obtain employment with Food Lion, then use hidden cameras to tape 
the alleged unsanitary food handling practices. With the union's help, the team 
created false identities and backgrounds for themselves. With supporting 
documentation, the producers applied for employment. Ultimately, Dale 
obtained work as a meat wrapper at two Food Lion stores in North Carolina, 
where she worked for eleven days; Barnett found work as a Food Lion deli 
clerk in South Carolina and quit eight days later. 407 
Together, the producers obtained more than fifty hours of hidden camera 
footage, and PrimeTime Live aired five or six minutes in its November 5, 1992, 
403 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 811, 824 (M.D.N.C. 
1995) (dismissing only civil RICO and federal wiretap claims). 
404 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (denying ABC's motion for summary judgment on claims of fraud, 
trespass, negligent supervision, and criminal conspiracy); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1224, 1233 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (denying ABC's renewed 
motion to dismiss claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unfair and deceptive trade practices 
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.) 
405 See Food lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822. 
406 See id. at 814. 
407 See id. at 816. 
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broadcast. 408 The footage was used to support allegations made by several 
former Food Lion employees regarding unsanitary practices at Food Lion 
stores. More viewers watched the November 5th telecast of PrimeTime Live 
than any previous telecast, and Food Lion suffered a drop in both retail sales 
and the value of its stock. 409 
Food Lion's subsequent lawsuit against Dale, Barnett, other PrimeTime 
Live producers, ABC and its then-corporate parent, Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
contained fourteen counts alleging a combination of state and federal claims 
involving-and limited to-ABC's newsgathering practices, and seeking some 
$2.5 billion in damages. Although Food Lion has publicly claimed the 
broadcast was false and defamatory, it did not claim libel, false light privacy, or 
any similar tort in its initial complaint.410 ABC sought to have all of the claims 
dismissed as violating the First Amendment.411 In denying that motion, the 
court quoted Cohen at length for the proposition that "generally applicable laws 
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against 
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. "412 
The court explained: 
In this case, Food Lion has alleged that ABC has committed fraud, trespass, 
and other wrongful acts. Like promissory estoppel, the laws governing this 
behavior are laws of general applicability which do not "target or single out the 
press." Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670. Therefore, ABC, as a member of the press, 
has no special immunity from the application of laws such as North Carolina's 
unfair and deceptive trade practices statute, and the First Amendment does not 
bar Food Lion's claims against it.413 
The court did agree with ABC that Food Lion should not be entitled to any 
damages based on injury to its reputation as a result of the actual broadcast 
unless it was prepared to meet the constitutional burden imposed by the United 
States Supreme Court on libel plaintiffs. 414 Here, the court relied on Hustler 
408 Seeid. 
409 Seeid. 
410 See, e.g., Kyle Pope, Food Lion Pressed by ABC to Release Certain Documents, 
WAll ST. J., Jan. 31, 1997, at B5; cf. Andron, supra note 2, at 16, 19. 
411 SeeFoodLion, 887F. Supp. at820. 
412 ld. at 821 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991)). The 
court again quoted Cohen when ABC subsequently argued that allowing a news organization 
to be sued under the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act would render the act 
unconstitutional. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 
(M.D.N.C. 1996). 
413 FoodLion, 887F. Supp. at822. 
414 Seeid. 
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Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, rather than Cohen, but quoted with approval Justice 
White's highly questionable assertion that Cohen was "not seeking damages for 
injury to his reputation," but rather for "breach of a promise that caused him to 
lose his job and lowered his earning capacity. "415 With the caveat that Food 
Lion could not be awarded reputational damages, the court denied ABC's 
motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds.416 
Unable to award reputational damages, or consider the finished broadcast 
as evidence, the jury found ABC liable for $1400 in compensatory damages, 
about half the wage and employment costs Food Lion claimed, plus $2 token 
damages for trespass and breach of loyalty.417 However, Judge Tilley did not 
preclude the jury from awarding punitive damages, and within a month it 
returned an award of $5.5 million against ABC.418 The jury said Richard 
Kaplan, former executive producer of PrimeTime Live, would have to pay 
Food Lion $35,000, and Ira Rosen, head of PrimeTime Live's investigative 
unit, $10,750. No punitive damages were assessed against Dale or Barnett.419 
Although the court subsequently reduced the punitive damage award,420 the 
notion that punitive damages can be awarded under Cohen without any First 
Amendment inquiry not only makes an end run around New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, it vitiates the constitutional protections afforded by that decision and 
its progeny.421 Unless the issue of constitutional protection for newsgathering 
415 Id. (quoting Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671). 
416 See id. at 823. In May 1997 Judge Tilley issued an opinion setting out the rationale 
for bis ruling that Food Lion could not recover damages resulting from "lost profits, lost 
sales, diminished stock value or anything of that nature." Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 958 (M.D.N.C. 1997). Judge Tilley pointed out that 
"Food Lion did not challenge the content of the broadcast by bringing a libel suit," so he 
assumed the content to be true for purposes of the trial. !d. at 959. Because the "publication 
damages" sought were not the "natural and probable consequences of [ABC's] fraud, 
trespass, [or] breach of the duty of loyalty," Food Lion could not show proximate cause and, 
thus, could not recover. !d. at 966. 
417 See Food Lion Awarded Damages from ABC, supra note 2, at D4. 
418 See Kurtz & Pressley, supra note 1, at AI. 
419 See id. 
420 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13214, at 
*48-50 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 1997). Judge Tilley denied ABC's motion for a new trial on the 
condition that Food Lion file a remittitur of all punitive damage amounts above $50,000 from 
Capital Cities, $250,000 from ABC, $7500 from Richard Kaplan, and $7500 from Ira Rosen. 
Seeid. 
421 Judge Tilley rejected ABC's constitutional argument for denying punitive damages. 
ABC had argued that, under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), punitive 
damages could not be awarded in matters of public concern without a showing of actual 
malice. Assuming arguendo that Gertz applied to newsgathering, Judge Tilley ruled that bis 
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torts is revisited, the Cohen dicta will set the cause of press freedom back more 
than thirty years. 
V. TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL RULE 
Up to this point, this Article has tried to show that the evolution of 
constitutional protection for newsgathering activities has been circumvented by 
incorrect, but seductive, dicta in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. This section will 
suggest a more appropriate reading of Cohen and articulate the kinds of 
constitutional rules that might evolve under such a reading. First, however, it 
examines the possibility that no constitutional rule is required, that common law 
principles, properly applied, are sufficient to protect newsgathering. This 
analysis leads to yet another case involving PrimeTime Live, hidden cameras, 
and misrepresentation by reporters. 
A. Desnick and the Common Law Alternative 
In its motion for summary judgment on Food Lion's trespass claim, ABC 
relied "extensively on Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, /nc.[422] 
for the proposition that misrepresentation in the inducement of consent will not 
negate that consent. "423 J .H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Services, Ltd., had also been 
the subject of a PrimeTime Live expose, which purported to document 
excessive and unjustified cataract surgery being performed on elderly Medicare 
patients at Eye Service's twenty-five midwestern eye clinics. After promising a 
balanced report, without ambush interviews, ABC obtained the clinic's 
cooperation to photograph its facilities and interview its personnel. Meanwhile, 
ABC personnel, posing as prospective patients, used hidden cameras to 
document unnecessary surgical referrals for the story that was ultimately 
broadcast. 424 Eye Services sued ABC and Prime Time Live principals for 
defamation and a host of newsgathering torts, all of which were dismissed at the 
trial level. 425 
instruction to the juzy-requiring a finding that ABC "acted with a consciousness of 
wrongdoing" -satisfies Gertz and protects members of the press who act "negligently or 
without intent to violate generally applicable laws." If ABC believed the instruction did not 
rise to the appropriate constitutional level, it should have objected when the instruction could 
have been cured. See Food lion, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13214, at *17-23. 
422 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). 
423 Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (M.D.N.C. 
1996). 
424 See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1347-48. 
425 See Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 303, 313 (N.D. ill. 1994). 
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On appeal, Chief Judge Posner reversed the district court's dismissal of the 
defamation count, 426 but affirmed on the news gathering torts of trespass, 
intrusion, fraud and violation of electronic surveillance statutes.427 Rather than 
rely on any constitutional theory, however, Judge Posner adopted a creative 
approach to the application of tort law to absolve ABC of actionable 
wrongdoing. Instead of focusing on ABC's misrepresentation, and whether it 
invalidated Desnick's express consent to enter the clinics, Posner looked to the 
values underlying the tort and found that no trespass-in other words, "no 
interference with the ownership or possession of land"428_occurred at al1.429 
Nor was there any intrusion-"no invasion of a legally protected interest 
in ... privacy"430_since the only conversations surreptitiously recorded were 
those in which ABC personnel participated. Also, without a tortious or criminal 
purpose, there was no violation of federal or state wiretapping laws.431 
Judge Posner is by no means the first to look beyond the standard 
articulation of a tort and rely on underlying principles to expand or thwart its 
application. One need only review the classic Cardozo opinion in MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co. 432 to be reminded that this is precisely how the common 
426 The defamation count later survived defendants' motion for S\liiliillU}' judgment on 
the ground that the allegedly defamatory portions of the broadcast were not "of and 
concerning" plaintiff J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Services, Ltd. See Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 24 
MediaL. Rep. (BNA) 2238, 2242 (1996). 
427 See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355. 
428 /d. at 1353. 
429 Judge Posner analogized ABC's fake patients to "testers" who pose as prospective 
home buyers in order to gather evidence of housing discrimination. See id. 
430 /d. Judge Posner distinguished such cases as Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F .2d 245 
(9th Cir. 1971), on the ground that misrepresentation was used to gain access to a place of 
business rather than a private home. See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352-53. 
431 See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353. Judge Posner stated: 
The federal and state wiretapping statutes that the plaintiffs invoke allow one party 
to a conversation to record the conversation unless his purpose in doing so is to commit a 
crime or a tort or (in the case of the state, but not the federal, law) to do "other injurious 
acts." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d); Wis. Stat. § 968.31(2)(c); Thomas v. Pearl, 998 F.2d 
[447,] 451 [(7th Cir. 1993)]; State v. Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc., 81 Wis. 
2d 555, 261 N.W.2d 147, 154 (Wis. 1978). 
Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353. 
432 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (expanding the principle of tort liability without privity 
of contract beyond inherently dangerous products to any product for which the danger of 
negligent manufacture is foreseeable). 
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law evolves.433 Perhaps the Cohen dicta has not curtailed the development of 
newsgathering protections after all. Even the actual malice standard of New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan had its origins in the efforts of common law judges 
to find a rule that protected the press from the vicissitudes of state libel law at a 
time when the First Amendment was thought to be quite irrelevant to state-law 
tort claims.434 
But Judge Posner himself admitted that "[t]he lines [between acceptable and 
actionable deceit] are not bright-they are not even inevitable. They are traces 
of the old fonns of action, which have resulted in a multitude of artificial 
distinctions in modem law. "435 Judge Tilley latched on to that concession to 
distinguish Food Lion from Desnick on the questionable ground that Litt and 
Barnett were not truly Food Lion employees and thus not privileged by the 
company's consent to enter into areas where only employees were permitted.436 
The fatal flaw in Defendants' argument is that it rests on the contention 
that Litt and Barnett were Food Lion employees and that Food Lion consented 
to presence of employees in the areas where Litt and Barnett were allowed to 
go. In fact, Litt and Barnett were actually ABC employees. A reasonable jury 
could find their presence in Food Lion to be purely incidental to their jobs with 
Prime Time live and that they hoped to be admitted to areas of the store not 
open to the general public to "steal" that which was otherwise not available to 
them-the images of those areas. Like the Demick examples of the purported 
meter reader who was really a snoop and the competitor who posed as a 
customer in order to gain entry and steal trade secrets, the misrepresentations 
which allowed Litt and Barnett to enter the restricted parts of Food Lion's 
433 See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REAsONING 20-25 {1937). 
434 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-81 (citing Coleman v. 
MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908), and other cases adopting the actual malice standard). 
435 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352. 
436 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 
(M.D.N.C. 1996). The attitudes of the two judges toward PrimeTime live and its ilk may be 
the real distinction here. Compare this description from Judge Tilley in Food Lion: 
"[PrimeTime Live] is not a 'straight news' program; instead [PrimeTime live] presents 
'undercover,' 'investigative' and 'inside' stories of a sensational nature designed to attract 
large audiences and Nielsen ratings, with the commensurate financial rewards and status 
within the television industry," Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 
811, 813 (M.D.N.C. 1995), with Judge Posner's characterization in Desnick: "[t]oday's 
'tabloid' style investigative television reportage, conducted by networks desperate for viewers 
in an increasingly competitive television market, constitutes-although it is often shrill, 
one-sided, and offensive, and sometimes defamatory-an important part of that market," 
Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355 (citation omitted). 
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stores could negate the consent which they were given.437 
Technically, of course, Litt and Barnett could not be liable for breaching 
their fiduciary duty to the company if they were not Food Lion employees, 
although Judge Tilley is talking about loyal, not legal, employees. It has yet to 
be established whether one can "steal" video images of another's place of 
business.438 Be that as it may, Judge Tilley's response to Desnick shows that 
Judge Posner's route to First Amendment protection for newsgathering is a 
slow and uncertain one. Although grounded in the common law, Judge 
Posner's opinion in Desnick makes two vital contributions to the evolutionary 
process: (1) it confines Cohen to its peculiar facts and holding, and (2) it 
establishes the theoretical underpinning for according First Amendment 
protection to newsgathering. 
B. Confining Cohen 
Judge Posner does not attack Cohen directly in Desnick. 439 In fact, he cites 
Cohen at one point for the very narrow proposition that "the media has no 
general immunity from tort or contract liability. "440 But he does attack, in an 
othenvise gratuitous reflection on Eye Services's fraud claim against ABC. 
437 Food Lion, 951 F. Supp. at 1222. 
438 See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that no action 
would lie against columnist Drew Pearson for receiving information he lrnew to have been 
stolen because the information was not protected "by the law of property, enforceable by a 
suit for conversion"); see also FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (finding liability for conversion limited to receipt and use of stolen documents for 
which the plaintiff had no copies); Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515 (E.D. 
Pa. 1990) (taking notes from a stolen police report, without actually possessing it, is neither 
the crime of receiving stolen goods nor the tort of conversion), qff'd on other grounds, 946 
F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991); Berger v. CNN, 24 MediaL. Rep. (BNA) 1757, 1762 (D. Mont. 
1966) (holding that appropriation of recorded images and sounds does not give rise to a cause 
of action for conversion). Dean Wade wrote, "Perhaps someday the law by analogy will 
develop to the point of recognizing a cause of action for obtaining the information in a fashion 
that would amount to conversion if it were a tangible chattel of monetary value. Of course, it 
has not done this yet." Wade, supra note 43, at 328. 
439 Indeed, one analysis of Cohen uses a cost-benefit analysis under the Hand-Posner 
model in finding that permitting sources and publishers to freely contract confidentiality 
agreements increases the net flow of information into the marketplace. See Joseph H. 
Kaufman, Comment, Beyond Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.: Corifidentiality Agreements and 
Efficiency Within the "Marketplace of Ideas", 1993 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 255, 273. 
440 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-
70 (1991)). 
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"Unlike most states," he observes, "illinois does not provide a remedy for 
fraudulent promises ('promissory fraud')-unless they are part of a 'scheme' to 
defraud. "441 Before proceeding to define "scheme" in a way that excludes 
ABC's actions and affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, 
Judge Posner pauses to consider the wisdom of lllir.ois's 
"ambivalence ... about allowing suits to be based on nothing more than an 
allegation of a fraudulent promise. "442 
There is a risk of turning every breach of contract suit into a fraud suit, of 
circumventing the limitation that the doctrine of consideration is supposed 
however ineptly to place on making all promises legally enforceable, and of 
thwarting the rule that denies the award of punitive damages for breach of 
contract.443 
There is no textual evidence that Judge Posner had Minnesota's law of 
promissory estoppel in mind when he wrote those words. Nor is there evidence 
that, in finding no actionable fraud in Desnick, he meant to criticize the 
application of that law to journalists. However, the comparison is inevitable and 
the contrast is clear: 
Investigative journalists well known for ruthlessness promise to wear kid 
gloves. They break their promise, as any person of normal sophistication 
would expect. If that is "fraud," it is the kind against which potential victims 
can easily arm themselves by maintaining a minimum of skepticism about 
journalistic goals and methods. Desnick, needless to say, was no tyro, or child, 
or otherwise a member of a vulnerable group. He is a successful professional 
and entrepreneur. No legal remedies to protect him from what happened are 
required, or by Illinois provided. It would be different if the false promises 
were stations on the way to taking Desnick to the cleaners. An elaborate 
artifice of fraud is the central meaning of a scheme to defraud through false 
promises. The only scheme here was a scheme to expose publicly any bad 
practices that the investigative team discovered, and that is not a fraudulent 
scheme.444 
Notwithstanding his attitude toward ABC's broken promise, Judge Posner 
held open the possibility that Eye Services might have prevailed on a contract 
claim that it abandoned, presumably to get an appealable final judgment.445 In 
441 Id. at 1354. 
442 ld. 
443 Id. 
444 Id. at 1354-55. 
445 Eye Services's subsequent motion to reinstate the contract claim was denied. See 
Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 958 (N.D.lll. 1995). 
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fact, he would have us read Cohen as a simple quasi-contract case, 446 with 
nothing precedential to say on the subject of newsgathering torts. If it were 
otherwise, Judge Posner could not say, as he does, that 
[t]oday's "tabloid" style investigative television reportage ... is entitled to all 
the safeguards with which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for 
defamation. And it is entitled to them regardless of the name of the tort, see, 
e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S. Ct. 876, 99 L. 
Ed. 2d 41 (1988), and, we add, regardless of whether the tort suit is aimed at 
the content of the broadcast or the production of the broadcast.447 
Where "no established rights are invaded in the process" of creating such a 
broadcast, Judge Posner declared, "then the target has no legal remedy even if 
the investigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious, confrontational, 
unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly."448 Where established rights have been 
invaded, the press is entitled, not to immunity, but to the kind of "safeguards 
designed to protect a vigorous market in ideas and opinions"449 that "the 
Supreme Court in the name of the First Amendment has hedged about 
defamation suits. "450 What follows is a search for those safeguards in the 
446 The Minnesota Supreme Court bad held that "a contract cause of action is 
inappropriate for these particular circumstances." Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 
199, 203 (Minn. 1990). 
447 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355. 
448 /d. 
449 !d. 
450 /d. Judge Posner's exact words are as follows: 
One further point about the claims concerning the making of the program segment, as 
distinct from the content of the segment itself, needs to be made. The Supreme Court in 
the name of the First Amendment has hedged about defamation suits, even when not 
brought by public figures, with many safeguards designed to protect a vigorous market 
in ideas and opinions. Today's "tabloid" style investigative television reportage, 
conducted by networks desperate for viewers in an increasingly competitive television 
market (see Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994)), 
constitutes-although it is often shrill, one-sided, and offensive, and sometimes 
defamatory-an important part of that market. It is entitled to all the safeguards with 
which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defamation. And it is entitled to 
them regardless of the name of the tort, see, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 108 S. Ct. 876, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1988), and, we add, regardless of 
whether the tort suit is aimed at the content of the broadcast or the production of the 
broadcast. If the broadcast itself does not contain actionable defamation, and no 
established rights are invaded in the process of creating it (for the media have no general 
immunity from tort or contract liability, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 
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newsgathering context. 
C. The First Amendment Right to Gather News 
Long before Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., it was well established that 
journalists had no "immunity from torts or crimes committed during the course 
of newsgathering."451 Today, long after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
journalists have no "immunity" from actions for libel, false light privacy, or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. But the absence of immunity, then or 
now, has never meant the absence of First Amendment protection. The task of 
the constitutional common law process is to define that protection in a way that 
affords appropriate safeguards for "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"452 
debate on public issues and reliable guidance to both journalists and judges. 
1. Routine Newsgathering Practices 
One possible direction for this evolution relies on the notion of "routine 
newsgathering practices" as the basis for constitutional protection. This 
669-70, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 115 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1991); Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, [61 A.D.2d 491 (1978)]), then the target has no legal remedy even 
if the investigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious, confrontational, 
unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly. In this case, there may have been-it is too early to 
tell-an actionable defamation, and if so the plaintiffs have a remedy. But none of their 
established rights under either state law or the federal wiretapping law was infringed by 
the making, as opposed to the dissemination, of the broadcast segment of which they 
complain, with the possible and possibly abandoned exception of contract law. 
Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1355 (emphasis added). I chose to paraphrase in the text because the 
italicized words are subject to being quoted out of context to justify denying constitutional 
protection for newsgathering torts. See, e.g., Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v. 
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 1997 WL 405908, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 1997), 
a case factually similar to Desnick, in which the court quoted Judge Posner's citation from 
Cohen to support its denial of ABC's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim that the broadcaster 
violated the federal eavesdropping statute by using a bidden camera to commit tortious or 
criminal acts. But see Deteresa v. ABC Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1997), in which the 
court affirmed a summazy judgment for ABC on plaintiff's claim that ABC's surreptitious 
recording of a conversation between a producer and a source violated the federal 
eavesdropping statute. While the Medical Laboratory court refused to dismiss even though the 
plaintiff merely alleged tortious and criminal pmposes, the Deteresa court required the 
plaintiff to "come forth with evidence" of a criminal or tortious pw:pose for her claim to 
survive summazy judgment. See id. at 466 n.4. 
451 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). 
452 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964). 
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approach has the advantage of a Supreme Court pedigree in Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publishing Co.,453 and the apparent flexibility to grow with the times and 
expand to accommodate technological developments. Unfortunately, 
Risenhoover, the Waco raid case, and Gift, the Rhode Island suicide case, 
suggest that constitutional protection for routine newsgathering practices, as 
applied today, does not protect newsgatherers from liability for any adverse 
consequences that flow from their merely asking questions. Even more 
problematic is the burden it places on judges to determine when new 
newsgathering practices have become "routine," a burden they can meet only 
by impermissibly insinuating themselves into the editorial process and second-
guessing journalists. 454 
The case of Wolfson v. Lewis455 poses the issue squarely: to what extent 
does the First Amendment "protect newsgathering by T.V. journalists using 
modem technologies?"456 The Wolfsons, husband and wife, are executives of 
U.S. Healthcare and relatives of the corporation's chairman. In early 1996, the 
Wolfsons sought and won a preliminary injunction against a crew from the 
syndicated television program Inside Edition. The couple claimed that the 
television crew engaged in "tortious stalking, harassment, trespass, intrusions 
upon seclusion and invasions of privacy"457 in the course of gathering video to 
illustrate a story on allegedly excessive compensation being paid to U.S. 
Healthcare executives.458 The journalists claimed that their actions were 
453 443 u.s. 97, 104 (1979). 
454 Perhaps Justice White himself spoke most eloquently to this point: 
We have learned, and continue to learn, from what we view as the unhappy experiences 
of other nations where govennnent has been allowed to meddle in the internal editorial 
affairs of newspapers. Regardless of how beneficent-sounding the purposes of 
controlling the press might be, we ... remain intensely skeptical about those measures 
that would allow govennnent to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's 
press. 
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurring). 
455 924 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Pa. 19%). 
456 /d. at 1417. 
457 !d. at 1415. 
458 See id. at 1416. In late January 1997 the injunction was vacated and appeal 
withdrawn as part of a settlement agreement. Under that agreement, the Wolfsons dropped 
their invasion of privacy lawsuit and the reporters agreed to stay away from the Wolfsons' 
home and families. See Health Care Executives' Suit Against 'Inside Edition' Settled; 
Supreme Court Won't Review Dismissal of RICO Suit Against ABC, NEWS MEDIA & L., 
Spring 1997, at 7. 
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protected by the First Amendment. 459 
fu considering that defense, the court acknowledged that television 
newsgathering enjoyed some First Amendment protection, but noted that 
[w]hen the First Amendment became part of the Constitution more than two 
hundred years ago, its drafters could not have imagined the existence of a 
television in most homes and the sophisticated tools available to T.V. 
journalists. T.V. journalists have at their disposal cameras with powerful zoom 
lenses, video camcorders that simultaneously record pictures and sound, 
directional microphones with the capacity to pick up sound sixty yards away, 
and miniature cameras and recording devices easily hidden in a pocket or 
behind a tie.460 
Relying on Cohen and other cases, 461 the court asserted that the "First 
Amendment does not ... shield the press from torts and crimes committed in 
the pursuit of a story. "462 The court noted that the "use of sophisticated video 
and recording equipment by T.V. journalists has increased the threat that a 
person's right to privacy may be violated. "463 fu this case, where the journalists 
followed their subjects from Pennsylvania to Florida, surveilling them, even in 
their home, with telephoto lenses and "shotgun" microphones, the court found 
that the Wolfsons "presented sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim for invasion of privacy based 
on intrusion upon seclusion ... by engaging in a course of conduct apparently 
designed to hound, harass, intimidate and frighten them. "464 
Up to this point, the court appeared to be on solid ground; no conceivable 
constitutional rule would immunize the reporters from liability if those findings 
were true. But the court then crossed the line into editorial judgment. As part of 
its analysis regarding the essential element of intent, the court found 
that the evidence is also sufficient to support a likelihood that a jury could 
determine that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lewis harassed and invaded the Wolfsons' 
privacy not, as defendants claim, for the legitimate purpose of gathering and 
broadcasting the news, but to try to obtain entertaining background for their 
T.V. expose concerning the high salaries paid to executives at U.S. Healthcare. 
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lewis characterize their activities as "routine 
459 See Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1416. 
460 !d. at 1416. 
461 See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (enjoining a 
freelance photographer from "harassing" Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis), aff'd in part and 
rev'd in part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). 
462 Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1417. 
463 !d. at 1418. 
464 !d. at 1432. 
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newsgathering" which is protected by the First Amendment. As herein set 
forth, the right to gather the news is not absolute; the First Amendment 
protects routine, lawful ne\Vsgathering. A reasonable jury would likely 
conclude that it is difficult to understand how hounding, harassing, and 
ambushing the Wolfsons would advance the newsworthy goal of exposing the 
high salaries paid to U.S. Healthcare executives or how such conduct would 
advance the fundamental policies underlying the First Amendment which 
include providing infonnation to "enable members of society to cope with the 
exigencies of their period. "465 
To the extent that the court's granting a preliminary injunction depended 
upon this particular finding, it demonstrates the inadequacy of a "routine 
newsgathering practices" standard for protecting the integrity of the editorial 
process. 
Note as well that this court's formulation is "routine, lawful newsgathering 
practices. "466 As long as the Cohen dicta remain operative, it is unlikely that 
the phrase "routine newsgathering practices" will be expanded to provide any 
constitutional inquiry when a tort is committed during the course of 
newsgathering, even in the most routine circumstances. 
If the Cohen dicta were firmly rejected, and "routine newsgathering 
practices" were interpreted to encompass those practices reasonably needed to 
obtain a story and appropriate for the medium through which that story will be 
transmitted, that rubric might come to provide the necessary constitutional 
protection. 
Absent those caveats, however, one must look to a more promising, if less 
likely, evolutionary direction. 
2. Ad Hoc Balancing 
Another possible alternative for protecting newsgatherers involves 
providing some mechanism for balancing the social value of the information 
sought or acquired against the social harm of the torts committed during 
newsgathering. Typically, calls for this kind of ad hoc balancing propose an 
affirmative defense that might be asserted by the newsgatherer-defendant. In the 
wake of the Food Lion verdict, for example, noted First Amendment lawyer 
Floyd Abrams invoked New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to call for more 
"breathing space in the process of gathering news. Perhaps it need be no 
broader than the introduction of some sort of public-interest defense for such 
claims that could permit judges and juries to factor into account the public 
465 !d. at 1432-33 (emphasis added). 
466 !d. at 1433. 
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benefit that might derive from this sort of conduct. "467 
The newsworthiness defense that attends the disclosure of private facts tort 
may be an appropriate analogy for the kind of defense suggested by Abrams. 
Generally, that defense is expressed as an element of the tort, namely, a 
requirement that "the matter publicized ... is not of legitimate concern to the 
public. "468 While the private facts tort is triggered only upon publication, it is 
often raised in connection with allegations of intrusion or other "misbehavior" 
in newsgathering,469 so the experience with the newsworthiness defense may be 
instructive here. 
The chief problem with ad hoc balancing is the uncertainty that it leaves in 
its wake. Floyd Abrams suggests that, on one set of facts or another, judges and 
juries "might choose not to" consider the public benefit of the challenged 
newsgathering practice.470 Even if he meant only that, on one set of facts or 
another, the harms might be found to outweigh the benefits, it is obvious that 
467 Floyd Abrams, 'Food lion' Endangers Muckrakers, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 1997, at 
A15 (emphasis added). Similar defenses have been proposed before. See, e.g., Note, And 
Forgive Them Their Trespasses: Applying the Defense of Necessity to the Criminal Condud of 
the Newsgatherer, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 890 (1990); Kathryn M. Kase, Note, When a Promise 
Is Not a Promise: The Legal Consequences for Journalists Who Break Promises of 
Confidentiality to Sources, 12 HAsTINGS CoMM. & ENf. L.J. 565 (1990). 
468 RFsrA1EMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6520 (1977). The Restatement definition in 
full is as follows: 
/d. 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) is not of legitimate concern to 
the public. 
469 In Parker v. Clarke, 905 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mo. 1995), for example, a mother and 
daughter sued the St. Louis police department and a local television station after the police 
invited the television station to tape the execution of a search warrant for drugs and firearms 
at plaintiffs' residence. See id. at 640. Although no charges were ultimately filed as a result of 
the warrant, the television station broadcast all or part of the video they shot on their local 
newscasts. See id. at 641. Plaintiffs sought to recover from the television station under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for violating their Fourth Amendment rights and under state law for invading 
their privacy by intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light 
publicity. See id. at 645. The court granted the station's motion for summary judgment on the 
§ 1983 claim, finding it had not acted under color of state law, see id. at 643, and declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See id. at 646. See also Dean 
Wade's discussion of cases concerning misconduct in both newsgathering and publishing in 
Wade, supra note 43, at 338-40. 
470 Abrams, supranote461, atA15. 
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neither journalists nor jurists would derive much guidance from such a rule. 
A second problem with the ad hoc balancing approach is that claims must 
be adjudicated with reference to the story that was planned or ultimately 
published. As a practical matter, that might seem to favor the media defendant. 
The analogous newsworthiness defense in disclosure of private facts torts cases 
has been interpreted so liberally that it is sometimes said to have "swallowed" 
the tort itself. 471 Still, this approach gives judges and juries, rather than editors, 
the responsibility for deciding what is newsworthy or in the public interest. 472 
One may surmise that it would afford little or no protection for newsgathering 
torts committed in pursuit of a false lead, because it seems too much to ask of a 
jury to excuse damage actually inflicted for the potential value of a story that 
never panned out. 
Thus, neither the current notion of "routine newsgathering practices" nor 
the technique of "ad hoc balancing" leads to a satisfactory degree of 
constitutional protection for newsgathering. 
A third and more effective possibility is adopting some variation of the New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan "actual malice" standard that would be appropriate 
for newsgathering. Although roundly criticized for its effect on libel law,473 
471 See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brmuleis Wrong?, 
31 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 326, 350 (1966); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a 
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brmuleis's Privacy Tort, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 291 
(1983). 
472 In his dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), 
Justice Marshall referred to the courts' experience with the privacy tort and to Kalven's 
article, see Kalven, supra note 471, in rejecting what amounted to a newsworthiness defense 
for libelling a private figure. Justice Marshall pointed out that the courts, generally, and the 
Supreme Court in particular, would have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a matter 
was of legitimate public interest. 
Courts, including this one, are not anointed with any extraordiruuy prescience. But, 
assuming ... courts are not simply to take a poll to detennine whether a substantial 
portion of the population is interested or concerned in a subject, courts will be required 
to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject; what 
information is relevant to self-government .... The danger such a doctrine portends for 
freedom of the press seems apparent. 
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (citation omitted). 
4?3 Criticism of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan approach to libel generally turns on 
empirical studies showing that libel suits are much too difficult for injured plaintiffs to win, 
much too expensive for media defendants to fight, and generally result in an outcome that 
satisfies no one. The Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act of 1993, 
approved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates at its February 1994 meeting, 
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such an approach is at once more protective than "routine newsgathering 
practices" and more predictable than "ad hoc balancing." 
3. Actual Malice 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny, the Supreme Court 
demanded a showing of "actual malice" -knowing falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth-by public officials474 or public figures475 who seek to prevail in a 
libel action, or by any libel plaintiff seeking punitive damages.476 By looking 
beyond this particularized definition of "actual malice" to the underlying evils 
deemed undeserving of First Amendment protection, one can discover analogs 
appropriate to newsgathering torts.477 
Defamatory information that the publisher knows to be false is presumed to 
injure the subject of the publication and that is why it exposes the publisher to 
common law tort liability. The information is not unprotected by the First 
Amendment because it is false, or because it is defamatory.478 It is unprotected 
by the First Amendment because it represents the publisher's intention to harm 
the subject, deliberate wrongdoing unrelated to news reporting, and a gross 
breach of faith with the public. Not only do knowingly false statements serve no 
salutary purpose in the proverbial marketplace of ideas, but they also actively 
distort that marketplace to the detriment of buyers and sellers alike. 
In gathering news, deliberate wrongdoing in bad faith, for example, 
tortious or criminal conduct beyond anything needed to obtain the story, is 
directly analogous to publishing knowingly false statements. Suppose, for the 
sake of argument, that PrimeTime Live undertook to crucify Food Lion at the 
is only the latest in a series of proposals aimed at reforming libel law. Under that proposal, 
damages could be severely limited by timely corrections or clarifications. As of this writing in 
mid-1997, however, no state bad adopted the proposed legislation, and no other legislative 
solution appeared viable. The Supreme Court seems uninterested in changing the law, as 
some have suggested, see, e.g., David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Refonning ?, 140 U. 
PA. L. REv. 487 (1991), and as complex as the law of libel has become, courts now have 
more than 30 years in applying it. Above all, no one is urging a return to pre-New York Tzmes 
Co. v. Sullivan standards. 
474 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
475 See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
476 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). 
477 As used here, the term "newsgathering torts" means any established tort allegedly 
committed by a defendant during the course of gathering information for the pmpose of 
disseminating that information to the public, whether or not dissemination has taken place. No 
special rule for the institutional press is intended, although instances of unaffiliated individuals 
committing bona fide newsgathering torts will doubtless be rare. 
478 See New York Tzmes, 376 U.S. at 273. 
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behest of the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union. Then, 
assume that PrimeTime Live had no reasonable suspicion of improper operating 
procedures, but they conducted the investigation anyway, and then went on to 
stage the unsanitary conditions that they later broadcast on television. 479 Any 
intentional torts committed by ABC personnel would have been in breach of 
faith with the public and undeserving of First Amendment protection. The 
inquiry is not whether the network deceived the target of its investigation-that 
would be privileged, without more-but whether the network purposefully 
deceived its audience. 
In the Wolfson case, the court found evidence that the Inside Edition crew 
was applying pressure to the Wolfson family, not for the family's contribution 
to their story on the excessive compensation of U.S. Healthcare executives, but 
to coerce Leonard Abramson, the company's chairman and Mrs. Wolfson's 
father, into granting an interview.480 If true, that, too, would constitute a breach 
of faith with the public undeserving of First Amendment protection. If, as 
alleged, the Wolfsons were never asked for an interview, were never intended 
to be a subject of the story, and were only exploited for coercive effect, their 
surveillance cannot legitimately be called newsgathering at all.481 
As "deliberate wrongdoing in bad faith" in newsgathering is analogous to 
"knowing falsity" in publishing, "outrageous behavior" seems a good analog 
for "reckless disregard for the truth." In both cases, the wrongdoing toward the 
public is not purposeful, but so egregious that it might as well be. Again, the 
focus is on the public, not the subject of the newsgathering, but the public's 
sense of outrage has long been considered a reliable gauge of harm to the 
immediate victim. 482 Although outrageousness is ultimately a question of fact, a 
court could first decide as a matter of law whether the evidence was sufficient 
to let the question go to a jury. 483 
479 The hypothetical is not at all far-fetched. Food Lion has made those very allegations 
throughout this case. See, e.g., Sue Anne Pressley, Food Lion Challenges ABC's 
Newsgathering, WASH. PoST, Dec. 12, 1996, at Al. 
480 See Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1432 (B.D. Pa. 1996). 
481 On the other hand, the court itself indicated that the Wolfsons were photographed so 
that the reporters could obtain "entertaining background for their TV expose." Jd. 
Furthermore, the defendants' expert witness testified that all activities were consistent with 
journalistic standards and "completely routine newsgathering." Victor A. Kovner et al., 
Recent Developments in Newsgathering, Invasion of Privacy and Related Torts, 1 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1996 at 507, 514 (Practising L. Inst. ed. 1996). 
482 Under New York law, for example, the degree of "outrage" needed to sustain a 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is "beyond the bounds of decency as to be 
regarded as atrocious and intolerable to a civilized society." Levin v. McPhee, 917 F. Supp. 
230, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 143 (1985)). 
483 That, too, would correspond with the actual malice standard. See Harte-Hanks 
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In the Food Lion case, for example, the ABC producers' misrepresentations 
on their employment applications would seem to fall well short of "outrageous 
behavior" as a matter oflaw. As Judge Posner says in Desnick, "any person of 
normal sophistication would expect" investigative journalists to break their 
promises. 484 On the other hand, use of a shotgun microphone capable of 
picking up conversations inside a private home, as alleged in the Wolfson 
case,485 could hardly be kept from a jury. To continue the New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan analogy, this variation of actual malice-deliberate wrongdoing in 
bad faith or outrageous behavior-would be required wherever a public official 
or public figure sought damages for a newsgathering tort. It would also be 
required where the defendant is covering government operations, such as police 
raids, even if the plaintiff is a private figure, to avoid chilling what is arguably 
the media's most important newsgathering function.486 Other private figure 
plaintiffs would be required to show at least negligence, but, as with the 
publication-based torts, negligence could not stand alone. Some other 
established tort-trespass, intrusion, conversion, etc.-must also be implicated 
by the newsgatherer's behavior. Obviously, neither Risenhoover nor Qijt could 
be sustained under this rule.487 
Even a private figure plaintiff would be required to show bad faith or 
outrageous behavior to recover punitive damages. The rationale is the same as 
that offered by Justice Powell in Gertz: 
In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded [for punitive 
damages] is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. 
Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts 
bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused. . . . They are not 
compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to 
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.488 
Moreover, punitive damages would not be available in any broken-promise 
case, even where styled as a breach of confidence tort, on the theory that these 
warrant contract damages only. 489 
These requirements are also imposed where .tortious or improper conduct is 
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989). 
484 Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995). 
485 See Wolfson, 924 F. Supp. at 1434. 
486 See Blasi, supra note 31, at 527. 
487 See supra text accompanying notes 369-84. 
488 Gertz v.'Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); accord Pacific Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that punitive 
damages can violate the First Amendment, despite their historical sanction). 
489 See Gilles, supra note 149, at 59. 
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a necessary predicate for civil or criminal sanctions. For example, the federal 
and most state anti-wiretapping statutes allow one party to a conversation to 
record it absent a criminal or tortious purpose.490 Newsgathering torts could not 
serve as a "tortious purpose" unless the actual malice standard is met. 
Likewise, no newsgathering tort could provide the basis for finding "improper" 
interference with contractual relations without a showing of actual malice. 
Should the Supreme Court ever hold that "unlawfully acquired" information 
may be more readily suppressed than information that is lawfully acquired, no 
newsgathering tort could supply the necessary "unlawfulness" absent a finding 
of actual malice. 491 
In sum, the First Amendment rule proposed here would require plaintiffs 
claiming injury resulting from a tort committed during the course of gathering 
news to show actual malice-deliberate wrongdoing in bad faith or outrageous 
conduct-on the part of the defendant where the plaintiff is a public official or 
public figure, or where the defendant is covering government operations, or 
where the plaintiff seeks to recover punitive damages. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
From Nellie Bly to the Muckrakers to Woodward and Bernstein, the 
importance of newsgathering to the realization of First Amendment values has 
been proved time and time again. This Article has tried to demonstrate that 
nothing in our constitutional jurisprudence precludes a court from closely 
examining the application of tort and criminal law to news reporters and, where 
First Amendment values warrant, holding the newsgatherer harmless. 
Eventually, a rule should evolve to safeguard the news gathering process itself. 
While the concept of "routine newsgathering practices" may provide such a 
safeguard if expansively interpreted, the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
"actual malice" standard offers the highest degree of protection. That standard 
has been severely criticized in the thirty-plus years since it was promulgated, 
however, and thus may be the least likely conclusion of an evolution toward 
recognizing First Amendment protection for newsgathering. To date, however, 
no one has suggested an alternative to the actual malice standard for libel that 
490 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994). 
491 Indeed, the logic of this argument suggests that "unlawfully acquired" information 
may never be subject to suppression on that ground alone, whether it is obtained illegally or 
tortiously by a journalist, or obtained !mowing it was acquired illegally or tortiously, or 
obtained under circumstances indicating that it must have been acquired illegally or tortiously. 
If merely punishing the tortious acquisition of news requires a showing of actual malice, then 
surely no prior restraint may be imposed on the publication of such information absent 
independent reasons for keeping it secret, i.e., certain, serious and irreparable harm. 
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has attracted the interest of state legislatures or the Supreme Court. Considering 
the alternatives for newsgathering torts, a variation on the actual malice 
standard offers the best combination of equity and predictability. 
Precedent for imposing such a standard is readily available in Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, and practical criteria for applying the standard may 
be found in the concepts of "deliberate wrongdoing in bad faith" and 
"outrageous behavior." Unless the Cohen dicta are disavowed, however, there 
will be no evolution at all, and newsgathering will continue to lack any real 
First Amendment protection from whatever torts may be conjured up by 
creative attorneys, unsympathetic courts, and antagonistic juries. 
